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One of the most studied capital market phenomenon relates to abnormal returns earned 
by various investment strategies. According to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), if 
markets are semi-form efficient, the current stock prices would timely reflect all publicly 
available information including historical prices and financial statement information 
(Fama 1970, 383). Consequently, investors would not be able to continually achieve ab-
normal returns using investment strategies based on ex ante return time-series and funda-
mental information. Various studies have, however, found empirical evidence that con-
tradicts with the EMH. There seems to be several persistent anomalies that are associated 
with economically significant returns, which have become central to the efficient market 
debate. The proponents of the EMH argue that these anomalies are compensation for 
higher risk whereas the opponents believe that these anomalies reflect mispricing. 
Whether these anomalies are compensation for bearing higher systematic risk or due to 
investors irrationality, there are various strategies based on style, market capitalisation 
and fundamentals that try to take advantage of these anomalies. 
The two most studied and persistent firm-level characteristics associated with excess 
returns are value and momentum. The value effect (or value premium) is generally the 
tendency of value stocks to outperform growth stocks. One of the most commonly used 
relative value measure to capture the value premium is the book-to-market ratio (B/M). 
Several studies including Fama and French (1992 & 1998), Chen et al. (2008) and Asness 
et al. (2013) have documented a significant and long-lasting value premium in stock re-
turns across the globe using B/M. In other words, high B/M stocks (“value stocks”) tend 
to on average outperform low B/M stocks (“growth stocks”). Approach in the momentum 
effect differs from the value effect as focus is on the relation between historical and future 
stock returns. The evidence supporting the strong intermediate-term momentum effect 
seems to be even more robust than the value effect. Various studies including Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993), Rouwenhorst (1998) and Fama and French (2012) have found that 
stocks with high past 3- to 12-month returns (“high momentum”) outperform stocks with 
low past 3- to 12-month returns (“low momentum”) over the next 3- to 12-month period 
across various markets after controlling for risk. Hence, stocks that have performed well 
in the past tend to on average produce excess returns in the short- and intermediate-term, 
whereas past losers continue to perform poorly. Whether the value and momentum pre-
mium are compensation for higher systematic risk or due to mispricing continues to be 
one of the central debates in asset pricing. Given the abundance of evidence for both risk 
and mispricing, it is difficult to conclude that neither of the two prominent explanations 
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is the sole cause for value and momentum premium. As there is evidence that the valua-
tion of value stocks is incongruent with fundamentals, momentum premium is too large 
to be explained with systematic risk factors, and even sophisticated institutional investors 
have behavioural biases, it seems difficult to conclude that the value and momentum pre-
mium are solely driven by higher risk at least in the short- and intermediate-term 
The empirical evidence also shows that fundamental information can be used to con-
struct investment strategies. Fundamentals-based investment strategies often take a more 
holistic view and focus on stock’s fundamental strength based on current profitability, 
cash flow generation, solvency and liquidity. Therefore, the key idea is to separate under-
valued stocks from overvalued stocks using relative valuation metrics and ex ante funda-
mental information that is not fully reflected in prices. According to Piotroski (2000), the 
fundamental analysis is particularly useful when applied to high B/M stocks. Although 
B/M strategy produces on average excess returns, less than 44% of the high B/M stocks 
produce excess returns in a one- and two-year period following portfolio formation. 
Hence, the return distribution of value strategy tends to be skewed and relies on the su-
perior performance of certain value stocks. (Piotroski 2000, 2.) To overcome this issue, 
Piotroski (2000) uses nine ex-ante financial signals to separate fundamentally strong 
value stocks from weak ones. These signals are aggregated into one composite measure 
known as the FSCORE, which measures the stock’s overall fundamental strength. The 
results are impressive as value stocks with high FSCORE (strong fundamentals) outper-
form value stocks with low FSCORE (weak fundamentals) in 18 out of 21 years. Further, 
the high FSCORE firms earn a mean market-adjusted annual return of 13.4% compared 
to -9.6% for low FSCORE firms – an economically and statistically significant difference 
of 23.0% annually. Novy-Marx (2013) also finds that value strategy’s returns can be im-
proved by controlling profitability. Using gross profit-to-assets as a profitability measure, 
more profitable value stocks outperform less profitable value stocks. Similar results have 
also been found in recent working papers by Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and 
Novy-Marx (2014). Both working papers find that fundamentally strong value firms earn 
on average higher risk-adjusted returns than fundamentally weak value stocks. Thus, it 
seems that there is some kind of premium towards higher fundamental strength and/or 
quality in the value framework. 
Compared to value stocks, fundamentals are still rarely used together with momentum 
strategies. However, if momentum strategies are driven by investors’ expectation errors 
and produce higher returns in low information dissemination environment like value 
stocks, it could be that fundamentals are also useful in momentum investing framework. 
Very recently fundamentals have also been used together with momentum strategy by 
Chen et al. (2016). They use FSCORE together with intermediate-term momentum and 
results are exceptional; strategy that goes long for stocks with highest momentum and 
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highest FSCORE and short for stocks with lowest momentum and lowest FSCORE pro-
duces abnormal returns that outperform traditional momentum strategy irrespective of the 
length of short-term holding period.1 Overall, it seems that fundamentals could be suc-
cessfully combined both with value and momentum strategies, opening a new interesting 
framework to study fundamental value and momentum strategies. 
1.2 Motivation and research questions 
Traditional value and momentum strategies have been studied extensively. In contrast, 
studies on fundamental value and particularly fundamental momentum are still at an early 
stage. The interest towards the relation between fundamental strength or quality and stock 
returns is however growing. By studying the combination of style and fundamentals-
based investment strategies, we can improve our understanding of how investors can po-
tentially construct portfolios with better risk-adjusted performance using fundamental 
signals. Hence, the main purpose is to examine whether fundamentals can be used to 
enhance traditional value and momentum strategies in order to earn abnormal returns. 
We form value and momentum portfolios with well-known measures, B/M and the 
past 12-month cumulative total raw return (skipping the most recent month). To measure 
fundamental strength of value and momentum stocks, we use the FS_SCORE introduced 
by Gray and Carlisle (2013) to separate winners from losers. The FS_SCORE is very 
close to the original FSCORE by Piotroski (2000), but makes some key improvements. 
As Piotroski (2000, 10) points out, FSCORE variables have been chosen quite ad hoc, 
leaving room for further enhancement. Like Piotroski (2000) and Chen et al. (2016), we 
expect portfolios with fundamentally strong value and momentum stocks to outperform 
against (1) portfolios with value and momentum stocks that have weak fundamentals and 
(2) all value and momentum stocks. In other words, we assume that ex ante fundamental 
information is not fully reflected in prices and that strong (weak) fundamentals should be 
positively (negatively) related to future stock returns.  
To test these hypotheses, we use several portfolio’s risk and return measures. Like 
Piotroski (2000), we use market-adjusted returns to measure the abnormal performance 
of fundamental value and momentum portfolios. However, in order to get a more thor-
ough view of the risk-adjusted performance, we will also use the Sharpe ratio, the CAPM, 
the Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-factor model. Therefore, in addition to 
testing the one-year buy-and-hold returns from pooled firm-year observations like Piotro-
ski (2000), we will also test portfolio returns to see whether portfolios produce statisti-
cally significant alpha after controlling for well-known risk factors. 
                                                 
1 Chen et al. (2016) also use the GSCORE tailored for growth stocks by Mohanram (2005), but the results 
are more robust using FSCORE.  
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The empirical part focuses on US equities between 1997 and 2015. We use stocks 
listed in the S&P Composite 1500 index, which combines three different indices: The 
S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600. The S&P Composite 1500 index 
covers approximately 91% of the US market capitalization as at the end of November 
2016, giving a broad and comprehensive sample of the US stock market. The reason why 
we include both mid-cap and small-cap stocks besides large-cap stocks is supported by 
the previous research. Firstly, both value and momentum effect have been documented to 
be stronger among smaller stocks (see Loughran 1997; Hong et al. 2000; Fama & French 
2012). Secondly, fundamental analysis tends to produce higher returns in low information 
dissemination environment, which typically includes smaller stocks that are not actively 
followed by analysts (see Piotroski 2000). Additionally, although there are several limi-
tations to investing in small- and mid-sized stocks, including these stocks in the sample 
can provide useful information for a broader investor community.  
1.3 The scope and limitations 
The theoretical framework and empirical part in this thesis focuses on value effect, mo-
mentum effect and fundamentals-based investment strategies. These three topic areas 
form the core of the investment strategy tested in the empirical part. In the literature re-
view we provide comprehensive evidence for value and momentum premium as well as 
risk- and mispricing-based explanations. Additionally, we try to emphasize value and 
momentum specific information reported in previous studies that could be used to en-
hance both strategies. The literature review on fundamentals-based investment strategies 
focuses on the concept of fundamental analysis and well-known investment strategies that 
use information from financial statements to take advantage of accounting-based anoma-
lies. It is also important to notice that as the focus the empirical part is on combining 
value, momentum and fundamentals from more a pragmatic approach, we exclude the 
literature on more sophisticated portfolio optimization techniques such as the modern 
portfolio theory (MPT). 
There are also several limitations in our thesis. The first limitations relate to our data 
sample. Firstly, the focus is solely on one asset class, namely equities. Even though value 
and momentum have been found in other asset classes such as bonds and currencies, we 
narrow our scope to stocks as we are interested in the usefulness of fundamentals in the 
value and momentum framework. However, studying cross-asset value and momentum 
strategies could provide a more comprehensive view and would also be likely to provide 
significant diversification benefits. Secondly, we limit our geographical scope only to the 
US. Although there is evidence that value, momentum and fundamental strategies can 
produce abnormal returns also outside the US, most of the studies are still conducted 
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using data from the US stock market. Thus, providing out-of-sample evidence from other 
markets would probably add more value. However, as we study whether an enhanced 
version of the original FSCORE can produce abnormal returns in value and momentum 
framework, our results should still provide value-adding information using US data. Fur-
ther, availability of data is far better for US stocks. Thirdly, our data requirements cause 
selection bias at some level. If a stock delists within one-year of portfolio formation, it is 
assumed that the delisting return is the last return provided by Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. Consequently, as Datastream uses a constant total return value equal to the 
last valid data point after the stock delists, we assume that the delisting return of the stock 
is zero after the month the stock ceases trading. This is likely to cause a delisting return 
bias of some kind, which can be particularly problematic if the stock is delisted for per-
formance-related reasons as it exaggerates returns. Our large sample size should, how-
ever, partly mitigate this concern.  
The investment strategy applied in the empirical part also has its limitations. Firstly, 
we only use simple value and momentum measures to form portfolios. It could be that 
other measures would produce better results either separately or jointly. For example, we 
could use other value measures such as earnings to price and cash flow to price ratios 
when forming value portfolios. Additionally, as we use 12-month holding period and re-
balancing frequency both for fundamental value and fundamental momentum portfolios, 
it is possible that higher gross returns could be achieved with a more frequent rebalancing 
frequency. This is particularly a concern among momentum stocks, where higher re-
balancing frequency and shorter holding period tend to produce higher returns. Neverthe-
less, excessive trading costs are not likely to be an issue for our strategy. Secondly, 
FS_SCORE is backward-looking by nature and is unlikely to be the optimal portfolio 
formation technique. It relies on historical financial statements, making possible that all 
alpha-relevant information has already been arbitraged away, and does not try to optimize 
portfolio’s risk and return characteristics. Instead, it is more like a first-stage tool for 
screening undervalued and overvalued stocks. In addition, FS_SCORE is based on an 
aggregate score from ten binary variables which can potentially eliminate useful infor-
mation. Thirdly, it is possible that a single fundamental measure such as the gross profit-
to-assets by Novy-Marx (2013) could subdue the majority of other variables used in 
FS_SCORE.  FS_SCORE is, however, very intuitive by nature and the original FSCORE 
has produced significant abnormal returns also in more recent studies such as by Piotroski 
and So (2012). Consequently, we believe that FS_SCORE provides a profound and effi-
cient way to examine whether traditional value and momentum strategies can be enhanced 
using fundamental information. 
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1.4 The structure of the thesis 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. In the second chapter, we review the pre-
vious literature on value effect, momentum effect and fundamental-based investment 
strategies. In addition to reviewing value, momentum and fundamentals separately, we 
present joint evidence from these strategies. As the focus on this thesis is in fundamental 
value and momentum strategies, the second chapter will broadly introduce two well-
known fundamental strategies, namely FSCORE and GSCORE. In the third chapter, the 
data and methodology for the empirical part are presented. When introducing the meth-
odology, focus is on presenting the FS_SCORE and its modifications relative to FSCORE, 
portfolio formation and measurement, hypotheses and statistical methods used to test the 
hypotheses. In chapter four, we present our main findings from the empirical part and 
conduct robustness tests for fundamental value and momentum strategies. The fifth chap-
ter summarizes our thesis and presents our main conclusions of tested hypotheses. We 





2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The value effect 
2.1.1 Book-to-market ratio in valuation 
Price multiples are one of the most popular valuation tools used by investors. Price mul-
tiple is a ratio that compares share price to some fundamental measure such as earnings, 
cash flow and book value. The same applies when using enterprise multiples, which com-
pare the firm’s enterprise value to unlevered metrics such as earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT). Thus, a price or enterprise multiple enables investors to evaluate the stock’s 
relative worth and can be used as a screening tool when selecting stocks to the portfolio. 
Price multiples are often related to fundamental analysis through discounted cash flow 
analysis, which drives growth and profitability forecasts. In addition, a common way in 
practice is the method of comparables, which is based on the law of one price for similar 
assets. (Pinto et al. 2010, 258–260.) In the method of comparables investors compare the 
relative value of a stock to selected benchmark price multiples, which are often companies 
operating in the same industry with similar key business characteristics and financial pro-
file such as size, growth prospects and capital structure. 
Price multiples are a crucial part of value investment strategies. In general, value 
stocks are considered to have high relative value measures such as book-to-price, earnings 
to price, cash flow to price and dividend yield.2 In contrast, growth stocks usually have 
low relative value measures which can reflect various aspects, including higher expected 
growth and profitability, lower risk profile and even mispricing. The most popular value 
measure used in the academic literature is by far the book-to-market ratio (B/M), which 
is calculated as firm’s book value of shareholders’ common equity (BE) divided by firm’s 
market value of equity (ME), or 





   
which is the inverse of price-to-book ratio. Thus, roughly speaking, the higher (lower) the 
B/M ratio is, the stronger (weaker) the value signal as lower share price implies higher 
expected return. 
                                                 
2 Inverse price ratios are often used in portfolio selection as it enables a consistent ranking (Pinto et al. 
2010, 271). 
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The advantage of using B/M ratio is that it often captures the value premium better 
than other value measures and it is a more stable measure than earnings or cash flows. 
According to Fama and French (2011), this stability is also important as is it lowers the 
turnover of value portfolio. There is also a clear relation between the stock’s B/M ratio 
and fundamentals. According to Harris and Marston (1994, 24), there is a statistically 
significant positive relation between B/M ratio and beta (i.e. systematic risk) once fore-
casted growth is controlled. Further, there is a clear negative relation between B/M ratio 
and growth prospects, and this seems to explain cross-sectional variation in B/M ratios 
better than beta. Fairfield’s (1994, 26) results also show that B/M ratio correlates nega-
tively with the current and the future level of profitability measured as return on equity 
(ROE). Although B/M ratio is related to fundamentals, it is also often criticized as a value 
measure particularly among non-financial companies. For example, as book value of eq-
uity merely reflects historical value of shareholders’ investments, it may not be an accu-
rate measure of company’s current value of equity. The key strengths and weaknesses of 
using B/M ratio as a relative valuation measure are summarized in table 1 below (Pinto et 
al. 2010, 295–296). 




 As book value of equity is generally  Book value of equity does not take into 
   positive, whereas earnings per share (EPS)    account off-balance sheet value drivers 
   can often be negative, book-to-market ratio    such as human capital and company 
   can be used in valuation even if EPS was    reputation that can sometimes be more 
   negative unlike earnings to price ratio    important than physical capital
 Book value of equity is more stable than  Book-to-market ratio can be a misleading 
   other fundamental measures such as    valuation tool when the level of assets
   earnings, which makes book-to-market ratio    differ significantly across companies
   a less noisy valuation measure
 Book-to-market ratio does not take into
 Particularly useful for valuing companies    account different accounting effects across
   with liquid and market-valued assets such    companies relating to capitalisation of intangible
   as financial companies    assets such as R&D and marketing expenses
 Empirical research shows that there is a  Book value often reflects the historical
   connection between book-to- market ratio    value of assets, which is a poor proxy for
   and fundamentals such as growth, profitability    the current value of shareholders'
   and risk    investment in the company
 Share repurchases or equity issuances may
   distort historical comparison
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2.1.2 Book-to-market ratio and value premium 
Although the use of B/M strategy was applied already by well-known value investors 
Graham and Dodd at the beginning of the 20th century, the B/M strategy started to become 
more popular again in the 1980s and 1990s. One of the first studies to capture value effect 
using B/M ratio was by Rosenberg et al. (1985), who found that high book-to-market 
strategy produced significant abnormal returns in the US stock market. At first the B/M 
effect was seen as a contradiction to the semi-strong market efficiency as stock prices did 
not seem to fully incorporate all publicly available information, but the cross-sectional 
relation of stock returns and B/M was further developed by Fama and French (1992). They 
reported a significant positive relation between stock returns and B/M ratio in the US and 
argued that B/M ratio is likely to be a proxy for some systematic risk factor such as finan-
cial distress. In addition, the combination of firm’s market capitalization (size) and B/M 
ratio captured the majority cross-sectional variation in average stock returns. This indi-
cated that cross-sectional variation in stock returns could not be fully explained with ex-
posure to market risk i.e. beta (Fama & French 1992, 445). 
Value premium has also been found to be robust internationally across various mar-
kets. To provide further out-of-sample evidence, Fama and French (1998) studied the B/M 
strategy in an international context. Their results showed a strong value premium between 
1975 and 1995; high B/M stocks outperformed local market and low B/M stocks in twelve 
out of thirteen international markets in the US, Europe, Asia and Australia. The average 
return of high B/M portfolio and value premium in the global portfolio was 14.76% and 
7.68% in excess of T-bill rate respectively (both statistically significant at the 1% level).3 
Various other studies have also found evidence on a global value premium since. Asness, 
Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) studied value and momentum jointly in eight interna-
tional markets and asset classes including stocks, stock indices, currencies, government 
bonds and commodity futures. They reported a strong value premium and correlation 
across all markets and asset classes for a long period. When looking at the long-only stock 
portfolios, the average raw excess returns, Sharpe ratios and alphas increase steadily when 
moving from low B/M portfolio to high B/M portfolio in each single market. The average 
raw excess returns, Sharpe ratios and alphas are between 13.2-16.7%, 0.67-0.84% and 
3.1-7.3% respectively. When the high minus low and factor portfolios are included, the 
value premium is strongest in Japan (Asness et al. 2013, 945).4 This seems to be due to 
growth stocks’ exceptionally weak performance relative to value stocks in Japan com-
pared to the other markets. There also seems to be a clear value premium in all other asset 
                                                 
3 Fama and French (1998) also found similar value premiums using other value indicators including earn-
ings to price, cash flow to price and dividend to price. However, the average value premium for the global 
portfolio was strongest when using book-to-market ratio.  
4 A factor portfolio is constructed by creating a long-short (hedge) portfolio that goes long for value stocks 
and short for growth stocks. 
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classes, but this is not in our focus as this thesis focuses solely on equities. In addition, 
measuring value in currencies, government bonds and commodity futures is not that 
straightforward as there is no measure of book value (Asness et al. 2013, 937). 
Although there seems to be persuasive evidence for international value premium using 
B/M ratio, there are also various other value measures that have demonstrated strong pos-
itive relation with future stock returns. Hou, Karolyi and Kho (2011) apply a wide sample 
of over 27,000 stocks from 49 countries between 1981 and 2003 to study what factors 
drive global stock returns. Although their results confirm a strong value premium across 
markets, the results seem to be stronger for other value measures than B/M ratio. Like 
Fama and French (1992 & 1998) they construct factor portfolios for each firm-level char-
acteristic. The average monthly return of earnings to price (E/P), cash flow to price 
(CF/P) and dividend to price (D/P) factor portfolios are between 0.63% and 0.75%, which 
is higher than the corresponding return of 0.55% for B/M factor portfolio (all statistically 
significant at 5% level). Additionally, CF/P seems to better explain the average cross-
sectional variation in global stock returns as the average time-series coefficients are 
higher and statistically more meaningful than for B/M ratio. This is particularly true in 
the latter part of the sample period between 1992 and 2003. Besides the above-mentioned 
price multiples, enterprise multiples are commonly used by many practitioners. Loughran 
and Wellman (2011) find that enterprise value (EV) divided by earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) has a strong positive relation with future 
stock returns in the US between 1963 and 2009. They construct high-low factor portfolios 
using the monthly averages of the value-weighted returns and find that the average return 
spread is 0.44% per month for EV/EBITDA factor portfolio. The factor returns are also 
statistically significant after controlling for Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-
factor models; the monthly alphas are 0.19% and 0.16%, both statistically significant at 
the 0.05 significance level. However, the factor portfolio using B/M ratio generates also 
a monthly return of 0.42% and is highly correlated with EV/EBITDA factor, reflecting 
rather similar information about the expected stock returns. 
The evidence also shows that value premium can vary with firm size.  Loughran (1997) 
finds that the B/M effect is significantly larger for small stocks than large stocks in the 
US between 1963 and 1995. While the high-low book-to-market spread is 11.25% annu-
ally for small stocks, it is only 1.80% for large stocks. Interestingly, when January is 
excluded from return calculation, small stocks still earn a significant value premium of 
9.09% annually, but there seems to be a growth premium among large stocks as high-low 
spread is -0.92%. Hence, the value premium seems to be driven mainly by small stocks 
(around 7% of the total market value) as there is no value premium for large stocks outside 
of January. (Loughran 1997, 255, 257.) Fama and French (2006) find partially contrary 
evidence to Loughran (1997). Although their results show that the value premium is 
clearly higher for small stocks (0.59% per month with t-statistics of 4.13) than for large 
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stocks (0.13% per month with t-statistics of 1.01) between 1963 and 2004 in the US, Fama 
and French (2006) argue that this depends on sorting stocks based on B/M ratio.5 When 
stocks are sorted based on E/P ratio, the value premium is still larger for small stocks, but 
drops significantly; value premium for small stocks is 0.43% per month with 4.20 t-sta-
tistics, compared to 0.26% with 2.07 t-statistics for large stocks. This is due to (1) higher 
returns for small growth stocks and (2) higher value premium among the largest stocks 
when using E/P rather than B/M (Fama & French 2006, 2170). Fama and French (2006) 
also use an out-of-sample test outside the US. The results show that value premiums are 
similar among small and large cap stocks using both B/M and E/P and that the difference 
is not statistically significant. Thus, the higher small cap value premium could be due to 
randomness or the relatively low share of larger stocks (Fama & French 2006, 2172). 
 However, as Fama and French (2012, 460) note, their sample size in the 2006 study 
was limited particularly for smaller international stocks (they used only two size groups). 
Contrary to the original results, Fama and French (2012) report a significantly larger value 
premium (difference of 0.42% with t-statistics of 2.76) for small stocks than for large 
stocks between 1990 and 2011 across markets in North America, Europe, Japan and Asia-
Pacific. Consequently, overall evidence seems to support that there is somewhat higher 
value premium among small stocks. This provides support for using fundamental analysis 
among small stocks that are often less followed and potentially mispriced. However, in-
vesting in small cap stocks is likely to be difficult for a majority of mutual fund and hedge 
fund managers due to higher illiquidity and transaction costs among small caps.  
2.1.3 Risk-based explanations 
Although there is an abundance of evidence showing that a portfolio of high book-to-
market stocks outperforms a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks, there is still no con-
sensus amongst researchers regarding the cause of value effect. In general, there are two 
major explanations for value effect. Firstly, there are risk-based explanations arguing that 
the outperformance of value stocks is due to compensation for higher risk. Secondly, 
many argue that value effect is due to investors’ irrationality which causes mispricing. 
There seems to be a major confrontation between these two theories for value premium. 
Risk-based theories are in line with the efficient market hypothesis as they argue that the 
value premium is due to systematic risk factors priced by investors, whereas behaviourists 
believe that the value premium is too large to be explained by systematic risk factors. 
                                                 
5 Fama and French (2006) measure the value premium slightly differently than Loughran (1997). They use 
monthly differences between the average returns of the two highest and lowest book-to-market and earn-
ings-to-price portfolios instead of the simple high-low spread used by Loughran (1997). 
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First we look into risk-based explanations that are consistent with rational and efficient 
asset pricing. Fama and French (1995) and Chen and Zhang (1998) were one of the first 
researchers to argue that value effect relates to firm’s financial characteristics such as 
financial distress, earnings uncertainty and financial leverage. Fama and French (1995) 
showed that high B/M stocks had persistently low earnings on book equity compared to 
low B/M stocks, indicating that value stocks are financially distressed. Interestingly, this 
was not just a short-term phenomenon as value stocks had low profitability for four years 
before and five years after the ranking. Conversely, growth stock tended to have stronger 
profitability. This supported the view that profitability is a common risk-based factor ex-
plaining the higher returns of value stocks. (Fama & French 1995, 132, 154.) Chen and 
Zhang (1998) took a slightly different approach than Fama and French (1995) as they 
used the standard deviation of earnings to price ratio, financial leverage defined as book 
value of debt divided by the book value of equity and proportion of firms that cut divi-
dends by 25% or more to see if value stocks have common risk characteristics. The results 
show that value stocks have on average higher volatility of earnings, higher leverage and 
are more likely to cut their dividends by 25% or more. All three risk factors also seem to 
be correlated with each other, B/M ratio and stock returns, indicating that they are proxies 
for a similar risk and capture information relating to returns. As returns are higher for 
high B/M stocks, these three risk measures seem to capture the value effect. The risk 
measures are also strongest and more persistent in the US, where the value effect is clearly 
stronger than in other countries. (Chen & Zhang 1998, 526–532.) 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) take the idea of financial distress further and study default 
risk premium in equity returns using data from equities instead of financial statements or 
bond market. They argue that financial statement data does not necessary indicate future 
performance and does not give a correct picture of asset volatility of stocks. Instead, they 
estimate the default likelihood indicators using the market value of stock’s equity for each 
single firm, which can be though as a market-implied default indicator. The results show 
that default risk is indeed related to the value effect. The value stocks have higher default 
risk than growth stocks and the value premium is strongest among stocks with the highest 
B/M ratios and default risk. Hence, B/M ratio seems to be a proxy for default risk that is 
a systematic risk factor. (Vassalou & Xing 2004, 832, 866.)  
There are also studies which connect the value effect to economic cycles, asset base 
adjustment costs, financial leverage and operational leverage. Zhang (2005) argues that 
value stocks earn higher returns than growth stocks due to asymmetric risk relating to 
investment and disinvestment costs. As value stocks usually have a higher asset base than 
growth stocks, the cost of reducing non-productive assets in economic downturns is cost-
lier for value stocks. This results in higher variation of earnings, dividends and stock 
returns in downturns. In addition, as the cost of capital is usually higher in economic 
downturns, the value premium increases significantly. On the contrary, in periods of high 
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economic activity, value stocks face smaller asset base adjustment costs than growth 
stocks and their asset base becomes productive, which results in smaller variation in earn-
ings and dividends during the economic upturn. (Zhang 2005, 68–69.) Hence, value 
stocks seem to have less flexibility to adapt their asset base to changes in economic situ-
ation, which drives the value risk premium. Similar results were also found by Cooper 
(2006), who argues that value stocks are more sensitive to changes in economic situation 
than growth stocks and that value premium depends significantly on investment irrevers-
ibility. When firms face economic shocks, the option to disinvest becomes important to 
reduce adverse impact. This is particularly true for value stocks as value stocks tend to 
have higher asset base than growth stocks. If a significant part of this asset base is irre-
versible, it becomes more difficult for value stocks to mitigate these shocks and book 
value of equity stays relatively flat compared to market value of equity. Thus, the higher 
the degree of investment irreversibility in asset base, the higher the systematic risk and 
value premium should be. (Cooper 2006, 139–141.)  
Recent study by Fama and French (2007) shows evidence that migration of stocks 
across value and growth portfolios explains a significant portion of value premium. In 
order to study migration across portfolios, Fama and French (2007, 48, 54) form six size-
book-to-market portfolios, which they further divide into four migration groups: 
• Same, which includes stocks that stay in the same size-book-to-market category 
one-year after portfolio formation. 
• Plus, which includes stocks that move to a lower book-to-market (growth) port-
folio or are acquired. 
• Minus, which includes stocks that move to higher book-to-market (value) port-
folio, are delisted or their book value becomes negative. 
• dSize, which includes small (large) stocks that become large (small). 
The results can be divided into two key parts. Firstly, migration between book-to-market 
categories is more common than between size categories and migration to higher (lower) 
book-to-market category produces significantly negative (positive) excess returns. Sec-
ondly, value premium is driven by Same, Plus and Minus migration groups, whereas dSize 
migration reduces the value premium across all size categories. The positive contribution 
to value premium by Plus and Minus migration is mainly explained by migration frequen-
cies (Fama & French 2007, 57). Plus migration (which produces positive excess returns) 
is significantly more common for value stocks (19.6-22.5%) than for growth stocks (0.7-
2.4%). Further, Minus migration (which produces negative excess returns) is more com-
mon for growth stocks (10.9-25.8%) than value stocks (0.1-1.0%). The third positive 
component to value premium is stocks that do not migrate across portfolios i.e. Same, 
which is mainly explained with positive return difference between value and growth 
stocks. Interestingly, these positive migration impacts are partly mitigated by small cap 
stocks that become big. Small stocks that migrate to big category are usually growth 
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stocks and produce on average significant excess returns, which reduces the value pre-
mium. (Fama & French 2007, 56–57.) Although Fama and French (2007) do not provide 
direct evidence that the value premium due to migration is driven by risk-based explana-
tions, they argue that there is an economic rationale behind migration. As value stocks on 
average improve profitability following portfolio formation, their book-to-market ratio 
tends to decrease due to lower risk premium. This is the opposite for growth stocks, re-
sulting in value premium. (Fama & French 2007, 48.) However, one could also argue that 
both value and growth stocks are mispriced by investors and thus converge to intrinsic 
value in period following portfolio formation. 
2.1.4 Mispricing 
Behavioural theories argue that value premium is not driven by higher risk, but in fact by 
mispricing due to biases among investors. These biases lead to systematic errors in inves-
tors’ expectations and thus cause value stocks to deviate from their fundamental (intrin-
sic) values. Thus, if investors underprice high B/M stocks, the mean-reversion could pro-
duce the value premium. In this case, value strategies would produce higher returns with-
out additional systematic risk (Chaves et al. 2013, 3). 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that investors are systematically too 
optimistic about growth stocks and too pessimistic about value stocks as they extrapolate 
past historical growth rates into the future. Historically value stocks have on average 
lower sales and earnings growth rates than growth stocks. However, these growth rates 
seemed to mean-revert following portfolio formation. (Lakonishok et al. 1994, 1559.) 
According to Lakonishok et al. (1994) the difference in ratios between value and growth 
stocks is driven by differences in ex ante expected future growth rates, which is reflected 
as higher (lower) B/M and CF/P ratios for value (growth) stocks. Therefore, investors 
seem to expect that growth stocks continue to outperform value stocks in terms of growth. 
However, this seems to be the case only at the beginning of post formation period. Alt-
hough growth stocks seem to grow faster than value stocks in the short-term (first two 
years), this development does not last. The growth rates for value stocks seem to reverse 
later in post formation period (last three years), which leads to higher returns for value 
stocks due to upward revisions in valuation as investors realize mispricing. Thus, inves-
tors seem to extrapolate past growth rates particularly in short-term. (Lakonishok et al. 
1994, 1562–1564.) The biased growth expectations could potentially reflect overconfi-
dence as investors overreact to private signals and underestimate forecast errors (Daniel 
et al. 1998, 1841). This could lead value and growth stocks to deviate temporarily from 
their fundamental value. Following these results, Lakonishok et al. (1994) then argue that 
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contrarian investors who take advantage of this are not exposed to higher systematic risk.6 
This argument is supported by the evidence that value strategies on average outperform 
growth strategies during economic downturns and that traditional risk measures beta and 
volatility are not sufficient to explain the large premium. 
La Porta (1996) uses survey data on five-year earnings growth forecasts by analysts to 
study similar hypotheses as Lakonishok et al. (1994). The results show that returns for 
stocks with low ex ante earnings growth forecasts outperform stocks with high ex ante 
earnings forecast by 20.9%, measured by a one-year holding period. Hence, investors do 
not seem to adjust for analysts’ too high or low growth expectations, which mean revert 
in the subsequent period. Additionally, analysts’ earnings forecast revisions and expecta-
tion errors are negatively correlated with B/M ratio, indicating that value premium is par-
tially explained with mispricing. (La Porta 1996, 1729–1732.) Evidence by La Porta 
(1996, 1738–1739) is also similar to that of Lakonishok et al. (1994); higher returns 
earned by value stocks do not seem to be due to higher systematic risk as stocks with low 
expected growth have on average lower volatility, lower market risk and perform better 
when stock markets fall. The results on extrapolation hypothesis, however, are more con-
troversial; value stocks tend to underperform stocks which are expected to underperform 
in the future although they have performed well in the past (La Porta 1996, 1737). 
Daniel and Titman (2006, 1607) argue that past fundamental performance (tangible 
information), such as historical sales and earnings growth does not drive value premium. 
Instead, there seems to be a negative correlation between intangible information about 
stock’s future performance (e.g. new high-tech products) and future stock returns. Thus, 
the value premium may be due to investors’ overreaction to intangible information, which 
drives the value premium as intangible returns reverse. (Daniel & Titman 2006, 1638, 
1640.) Similar results were also found by Jiang (2010), who studied institutional investors 
trading to intangible information. Surprisingly, the results show that institutional inves-
tors do not trade against intangible information to capture the value premium. Institutional 
investors seem to buy (sell) stocks with positive (negative) intangible information, which 
increases (decreases) institutional ownership in stocks with high (low) historical intangi-
ble returns. Institutional investors’ historical trading volumes are also negatively related 
to future intangible returns as return reversals are higher among stocks with high institu-
tional trading volumes due to positive intangible information. Hence, institutional inves-
tors also seem to overreact to intangible information, which drives value premium as 
stocks with low historical intangible returns (value stocks) outperform stocks with high 
historical intangible returns (growth stocks). (Jiang 2010, 99.) Jiang (2010, 112) then ar-
gues that stocks with low intangible returns are not fundamentally riskier than stocks with 
                                                 
6 Contrarian investors tend to buy out-of-favour stocks such as value stocks as they believe that these are 
underpriced by other naïve market participants (Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny 1994, 1542). 
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high intangible returns, as the return spread cannot be explain with traditional asset pric-
ing models due to significant alphas when the measure of institutional investors herding 
is high. Consequently, institutional investors’ behaviour does not always seem to be ra-
tional, contributing to the value premium. 
Piotroski and So (2012) tested the mispricing hypothesis by comparing investors’ ex 
ante expectations to fundamentals in order to identify if there are potential expectation 
errors. This means that value and growth stocks are mispriced if their performance ex-
pectations are not consistent with their expected performance implied by fundamental 
strength (Piotroski & So 2012, 2846–2847). Piotroski and So (2012) measure investors’ 
expectations by B/M ratio and use composite FSCORE to measure fundamental strength, 
which is the aggregate of nine binary financial statement signals. Firms with strong fun-
damentals have high FSCORE and firms with weak fundamentals have low FSCORE. 
The results supported the mispricing hypothesis as value and growth effect were strongest 
among stocks with inconsistent ex ante expectations between B/M ratio and FSCORE. 
Growth stocks with low FSCORE (score 0-3) had an average -14.38% annual size-ad-
justed buy-and-hold return, whereas value stocks with high FSCORE (score 7-9) had an 
average 8.26% annual size-adjusted buy-and-hold return. Further, the returns were lower 
for stocks with congruent expectations relative to fundamentals. Inconsistent value strat-
egy also produced positive returns in 35 years out of 39 compared to 27 for consistent 
value strategies, and outperformed almost each year. (Piotroski & So 2012, 2851–2854.) 
Thus, it seems that investors ignore ex ante fundamental signals among high value and 
growth firms, resulting in mispricing and value premium. This can also be seen as a pos-
itive difference in earnings period announcement returns, analyst errors and analyst fore-
cast revisions between growth firms with low FSCORE and value firms with high 
FSCORE (Piotroski & So 2012, 2861, 2863). 
Many are likely to argue that if there persists mispricing among value and growth 
stocks, why arbitrageurs do not trade against mispricing? One plausible reason for this 
could be the arbitrage risk hypothesis suggested by Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2010) 
and Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2003). Assuming that arbitrageurs are risk-averse inves-
tors that who often focus on a limited amount of stocks, arbitrage risk is closely related 
to idiosyncratic volatility. Portfolios with limited diversification have higher idiosyncratic 
volatility, which increases portfolio risk without additional compensation (Ali et al. 2003, 
358). If arbitrageurs are not able to hedge idiosyncratic risk (i.e. take an opposite position 
for mispriced stock with a close substitute), it is difficult for arbitrageurs to eliminate 
fundamental risk and they may not be able to purchase (sell) undervalued (overvalued) 
23 
stocks. Hence, stocks with higher idiosyncratic risk can be mispriced as arbitrageurs can-
not eliminate arbitrage opportunities.7 Consistent with this hypothesis, mispricing seems 
to be persistent among stocks with higher idiosyncratic risk and lower institutional own-
ership. (Doukas et al. 2010, 922, 930.) As Ali et al. (2003) show that value effect is on 
average stronger among stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility, higher transaction 
costs and lower investor sophistication, it seems that arbitrage risk can cause prices to 
deviate from fundamental values and thus contribute to the value effect. This seem par-
ticularly true among smaller stocks that often suffer from the above-mentioned charac-
teristics. It has to be noted, however, that both Ali et al. (2003) and Doukas et al. (2010) 
use historical idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk, which might not be 
a good proxy for future risk. 
2.2 Investment strategies based on fundamentals 
2.2.1 Fundamental analysis in brief 
Focus on traditional fundamental analysis is in evaluating the current price of stock rela-
tive to its fundamentals such as future sales growth, earnings and cash flows (Palepu & 
Healy 2008). Thus, fundamental analysis is essentially about valuation and identifying 
mispriced securities relative to intrinsic value. To be successful in practice as an invest-
ment strategy, fundamental investment strategies assume that fundamentals have predic-
tive power regarding future stock returns and have not been priced by other market par-
ticipants (Palepu & Healy 2008). Under semi-efficient markets, it would be impossible to 
identify systematically mispriced securities using fundamental analysis as all relevant 
public information would be reflected in prices. There exists, however, a variety of studies 
showing that fundamental investment strategies can produce abnormal returns. This indi-
cates that stock prices do not necessarily always fully reflect all publicly available infor-
mation, making fundamental analysis useful in active portfolio management. 
Focus in traditional fundamental analysis is both on quantitative and qualitative infor-
mation. According to Palepu and Healey (2008), fundamental analysis can be divided into 
four steps: (1) Business strategy analysis, (2), Accounting analysis, (3) Financial analysis 
and (4) Prospective analysis. Fundamental analysis often starts with business strategy 
                                                 
7 Barberis et al. (1998) suggest that there is also a behavioural reason behind arbitrage risk. Eliminating 
mispricing can be risky for arbitrageurs particularly in the short-term if investor sentiment varies and is 
unpredictable. This can cause prices to deviate from fundamentals even further (“noise trader risk”) and 
limits arbitrageurs’ willingness to eliminate mispricing. (Barberis et al. 1998, 309.) 
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analysis and includes industry analysis, competitive strategy analysis, and corporate strat-
egy analysis. Analysing qualitative factors is important as it enables investor to better 
understand firm’s financial metrics, identify key profit drivers and risks and make more 
sound assumptions about firm’s future performance. Following business strategy analy-
sis, investors often analyse firm’s accounting policies, estimates and flexibility in order 
to evaluate its appropriateness and potential distortions. Adjusting for accounting distor-
tions is often important to get a better picture of the underlying financial development. In 
the next step investors use adjusted accounting numbers to analyse firm’s financial de-
velopment with ratio and cash flow analysis, which can be reflected to firm’s strategy and 
objectives. Ratio analysis tends to focus on firm’s growth and profitability performance, 
whereas cash flow analysis is more about analysing operating cash flow, free cash flow, 
source of funds, flexibility and ability to meet financial obligations and pay dividends. 
The last step in fundamental analysis is prospective analysis, where focus is on forecast-
ing firm’s future performance. This includes both financial statement forecasting and val-
uation, which require substantial amount of subjective judgment and information from 
the first three steps. (Palepu & Healy 2008.) Following valuation investors can compare 
public firm’s estimated intrinsic value to the current market price to determine whether 
its stock is over- or undervalued. This kind of fundamental analysis in portfolio selection 
is, however, resource-consuming, relies on individual investment results and susceptible 
for cognitive biases, paving the way for quantitative fundamental strategies.  
The quantitative fundamental strategies are often used in portfolio selection. These 
strategies tend to rely more on expectable group outcome as they focus on taking ad-
vantage of various systematic accounting anomalies. The focus is on selecting stocks 
from a broad universe based on factors such as analysts’ earnings revisions, valuation 
multiples and other fundamental indicators. Hence, quantitative fundamental strategies 
essentially attempt to separate ex post winners from losers using signals from financial 
statements and other company announcements. As these strategies rely solely on quanti-
tative data, they can be seen more robust to behavioural decision-making errors (Gray & 
Carlisle 2013, 31). However, these strategies may have higher transaction costs due to 
more frequent rebalancing of portfolios. Additionally, as mispricing is often concentrated 
among smaller and less liquid stocks, the feasibility of these strategies could be limited 
particularly among institutional investors. Quantitative fundamental strategies are argued 
to be more beneficial among value stocks as focus in value stocks is often more on recent 
fundamentals than qualitative factors. In contrast, analysis in growth stocks is often based 
more on long-term prospects and intangible information. (Piotroski 2000, 4.) However, 
as we shall later see, fundamental analysis can also be useful among growth stocks and 
momentum stocks as shown by Mohanram (2005) and Chen et al. (2016). As the focus in 
this study is on combining value and momentum with fundamentals, the rest of this chap-
ter will focus on empirical evidence from quantitative fundamental strategies.  
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2.2.2 Evidence from fundamentals-based investment strategies 
One of the first comprehensive studies that used fundamentals to establish investment 
strategy was by Ou and Penman (1989). Their investment strategy is based on the notion 
that future earnings are positively correlated with future stock returns, which makes iden-
tifying fundamental variables that can predict future earnings value-adding for investors 
if the information is not reflected in prices. Ou and Penman (1989) select first the total of 
68 different accounting variables and asses the predictive power of these variables over 
two periods 1965–1972 and 1973–1977. Based on various statistical tests Ou and Penman 
(1989) select variables with the highest statistical relationship with the direction of one-
year ahead earnings. They identify 16 and 18 most significant accounting variables for 
the two periods, which are then combined into one summary probability measure ?̂?𝑟 that 
indicates the direction of one-year ahead earnings change for each stock. The probability 
measure ?̂?𝑟 is then used to allocate stocks into 24-month buy-and-hold long and short 
portfolios for 1973–1977 and 1978–1983 periods. Ou and Penman (1989) allocate stocks 
with higher than 0.6 probability increasing their earnings in long portfolios, whereas 
stocks with lower than 0.4 probability increasing their earnings are included in short port-
folios. These portfolios are constructed three months after the end of fiscal year, which 
might produce a look-ahead bias. The results show that the ?̂?𝑟 measure is able to predict 
both future earnings direction and stock returns. The long-short portfolio produces an 
average market-adjusted cumulative 24-month buy-and-hold return of 14.53% over the 
period 1973–1983, which is more driven by the short-side (Ou & Penman 1989, 314).  
The robustness of Ou and Penman (1989) results have, however, been questioned. Re-
sults by Greig (1992) show that when firm size is controlled, the positive relationship 
between probability measure ?̂?𝑟 and future stock returns disappears both at portfolio- and 
individual firm-level. Thus, higher returns earned by fundamental strategy based on prob-
ability measure ?̂?𝑟 seem to be driven by the size effect rather than mispricing. (Greig 
1992, 415.) Holthausen and Larcker (1992) also test Ou and Penman’s (1989) strategy 
with a slightly different sample and time-period. Similar to the results of Ou and Penman 
(1989), the probability measure ?̂?𝑟 seems to have predictive power regarding future earn-
ings. However, the average market-adjusted 24-month buy-and hold return for the long-
short portfolio is only 2.23% over the 1978–1988 period, which is considerably less what 
Ou and Penman (1989) reported. This is mainly due to considerably weaker performance 
after 1983 as long-short strategy produces negative excess returns. (Holthausen & Larcker 
1992, 403, 405). Holthausen and Larcker (1992) find, however, that the 68 accounting 
variables used by Ou and Penman (1989) can be useful in producing excess returns in a 
different setup. Instead of predicting future earnings changes, they develop a model that 
uses accounting variables to predict one-year ahead excess returns. This strategy produces 
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an average 24-month buy-and hold excess return of 4.26-7.97% for market-adjusted, 
CAPM-adjusted and size-adjusted returns. 
The early research connecting financial statement measures and equity valuation has 
been criticized by Nissim and Penman (2001). According to Nissim and Penman (2001, 
110), the relation between stock returns and various fundamental measures has been an-
alysed in an ad hoc manner and without a structural approach to equity valuation. Nissim 
and Penman (2001) take a completely different approach and use residual income equity 
valuation model as a starting point for identifying useful rations in financial statement 
analysis and valuation. They decompose the components of residual income model into 
key profitability and growth ratios that drive future residual income. For example, fore-
casting return on common equity (ROCE) is one of the key drivers for forecasting residual 
income in the residual income model. ROCE can be further decomposed into weighted 
average of the return on operating activities and the return on financing activities. Ac-
cordingly, the return on operating activities can be shown as return on operating assets 
(RNOA), and the return on financing activities can be shown as net borrowing costs or 
return on net financial assets (NBC). Hence, ROCE is driven by return on operations and 
leverage effect from net financial assets. (Nissim & Penman 2001, 115–116.) This kind 
of decomposition of residual income model drivers shows that there is a clear connection 
between financial statement variables and equity valuation. This is contrary to the above-
mentioned empirical studies such as by Ou and Penman (1989), where useful financial 
statement ratios were identified (“fitted”) from historical correlations without clear con-
nection to equity valuation (Nissim & Penman 2001, 125). 
The more structural approach to fundamental analysis introduced by Nissim and Pen-
man (2001) is adapted by Wahlen and Wieland (2011). They study whether ex ante fi-
nancial statement information is useful in predicting the change in one-year ahead earn-
ings and if strategy based on predicted earnings changes outperforms sell-side analysts’ 
consensus recommendations. To forecast the change in one-year ahead earnings, Wahlen 
and Wieland (2011) develop predicted earnings increase score (PEIS), which consists of 
six out-of-sample fundamental signals: the return on operating assets (RNOA), the change 
in gross margin less the change in sales (ΔGM), the change in the ratio of selling, general, 
and administrative expenses relative to sales (ΔSGA), the change in asset turnover ratio 
(ΔATO), the growth in net operating assets (GNOA) and accruals (ACC). To construct an 
aggregate PEIS for each firm, they give each signal a score of +1 (top), 0 (middle) and -
1 (bottom) depending on the implication for future performance.8 Thus, higher PEIS in-
dicates a greater likelihood of positive future earnings increase. Wahlen and Wieland’s 
                                                 
8 Although Wahlen and Wieland (2011) use somewhat similar scoring system as Piotroski (2000), there is 
one clear difference. In PEIS it is assumed that RNOA is negatively related to future earnings (mean-rever-
sion), meaning that currently loss-making firms receive a higher score. Contrary to this, in FSCORE firms 
that are profitable receive a higher score as this trend is expected to continue in the future. 
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(2011) results show that PEIS is useful both in predicting future earnings and as an in-
vestment strategy in a 12-year sample period. Firstly, 63.9% of firms in the highest PEIS 
quintile increase one-year ahead earnings compared to 51.3% for firms in the lowest quin-
tile and 59.2% for the whole sample. Secondly, investment strategy that goes long (short) 
for stocks in the highest (lowest) PEIS quintile produces annual buy-and-hold abnormal 
return of 9.8%. This outperforms analysts’ consensus recommendations as strategy that 
goes long for strong buy and buy recommendations and short for sell recommendations 
produces a significant negative abnormal return of -9.0%. When future returns are con-
trolled for various risk factors, long-short PEIS strategy produces annual abnormal return 
of 10.9% compared to 0.9% for long-short strategy following analysts’ recommendations. 
This indicates that stock prices and consensus estimates by analysts do not fully corporate 
all relevant information in financial statements to prices, producing abnormal returns for 
strategies that utilize this information. (Wahlen & Wieland 2011, 111.) 
Novy-Marx (2013) studies the relation between gross profit-to-assets, B/M ratio and 
stock returns between 1963 and 2010.9 The results from Fama-Macbeth regressions sug-
gest that both gross profit-to-assets and B/M ratio predict cross-sectional stock returns 
and that the relation is positive. Further, the predictive power of earnings-to-book equity, 
free cash flow-to-book equity, EBITDA-to-assets and SG&A-to-assets are subsumed af-
ter controlling for gross profit-to-assets. (Novy-Marx 2013, 3.) The predictive power of 
gross profit-to-assets could, however, be driven by anomalies relating to earnings quality 
such as accruals, research and development expenses (R&D) and advertising expenses. 
Sloan (1996) finds that the accrual component of earnings has lower persistence than the 
cash flow component of earnings. Investors do not seem to fully reflect this difference as 
firms with a higher (lower) cash flow component in their earnings produce positive (neg-
ative) abnormal returns. Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001) find that many firms 
in growth industries such as technology and pharmaceuticals have high R&D and adver-
tising expenditures relative to current earnings and book values. This may lead to mis-
pricing as investors underestimate the long-term benefits of R&D and advertising. (Chan 
et al. 2001, 2432.) The results show that firms with high R&D and advertising spending 
relative to market value produce on average abnormal returns of 6.12% and 3.10% annu-
ally over a three-year post formation period, indicating that markets might be too pessi-
mistic about these stocks. The results by Novy-Marx (2013) nevertheless show that gross 
profitability premium remains after controlling for accruals and R&D expenditures. 
When portfolios are sorted based on gross profit-to-assets, two interesting results emerge. 
Firstly, there is a significant gross profit premium. The average excess returns increase 
with profitability and high-low spread is 0.31% per month with t-statistic of 2.49. Sec-
ondly, the gross profitability strategy is driven by growth firms as firms with high gross 
                                                 
9 Gross profit is scaled by assets as it is an unlevered measure (Novy-Marx 2013, 3).  
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profit-to-assets tend to have significantly lower book-to-market ratios than low profita-
bility firms and the portfolio has a clear negative loading to high-low book-to-market 
portfolio factor. Further, the negative correlation of -0.57 between gross profit-to-assets 
strategy and value strategy produces a superb hedge portfolio over the period. (Novy-
Marx 2013, 6–7.) Consistent with this, returns for value strategies improve when profita-
bility is controlled, and returns for profitability strategies improve when value is con-
trolled. Hence, both profitable value and growth firms outperform unprofitable ones. This 
strategy also works with large cap stocks, producing on average excess returns of 0.62% 
per month when going long (short) for value (growth) stocks with high (low) profitability. 
Hence, controlling profitability seems to be important both in value and growth portfolios 
and suggests that value premium is not driven by stocks that are financially distressed 
(Novy-Marx 2013, 16). Instead, there seems to be a premium towards financial quality.  
2.2.3 Combining value and fundamentals – Piotroski FSCORE 
Value effect and fundamental analysis was combined by Piotroski (2000) based on pre-
vious empirical research. Piotroski (2000, 2) argued that using fundamental analysis for 
value stocks is appropriate as value stocks are often neglected by investors and analysts, 
have lower informational efficiency and are often financially distressed. Even more im-
portantly, less than 44% of value stocks earned positive market-adjusted returns during a 
two-year holding period. Hence, majority of value stocks underperformed the market. As 
a large part of value stocks are fundamentally weak ex ante and produce negative market-
adjusted returns ex-post, it seemed that value portfolio’s returns and return distribution 
could be enhanced using ex ante fundamental information. 
In order to separate fundamentally strong value firms from weak ones, Piotroski (2000) 
created accounting-based fundamental analysis strategy known as FSCORE. This strat-
egy was applied to all value stocks and was based on nine signals/variables from financial 
statements to measure three areas of fundamental strength: (1) Profitability, (2) Financial 
leverage/liquidity and (3) Operating efficiency. All nine binary signals were classified 
either as “good” (1) or “bad” (0) depending on financial implication for the firm’s future 
fundamentals and stock returns. These variables are shown in table 2 and are used to 
calculate the aggregate score, which is the sum of the nine binary signals. The aggregate 
FSCORE measures the overall fundamental strength of the stock and can be written as: 
   
 𝐹𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐹_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹_∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐹_∆𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹_∆𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑄_𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐹_∆𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹_∆𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 
(2) 
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As there are nine binary signals, the aggregate FSCORE can range between zero and nine. 
High FSCORE indicates that a firm is financially strong, whereas low FSCORE signals 
weak fundamentals. Consequently, the investment strategy is based on selecting value 
stocks with high FSCORE as it is assumed that strong ex ante fundamentals are positively 
related to future fundamentals and stock returns. (Piotroski 2000, 7–9.) It can also be 
thought that financial strength contributes to margin of safety as stronger firms can better 
absorb shocks caused by business cycles and competition (Gray & Carlisle 2013, 114). 
Table 2 FSCORE variable definitions 
 
Financial performance signals Measurement Indicator variable
1
Profitability




ROA t = Net income before extraordinary items t  / Total 
assets t-1
If F_ROA t  > 0, then 1, 
otherwise 0
Change in gross margin ΔMARGIN t = MARGIN t  - MARGIN t-1
If F_ΔMARGIN t  > 0, then 
1, otherwise 0
Cash flow from operations CFO t = Cash flow from operations t  / Total assets t-1
If F_CFO t  > 0, then 1, 
otherwise 0
Change in return on assets ΔROA t = ROA t  - ROA t-1
If F_ΔROA t  > 0, then 1, 
otherwise 0
Accruals
ACCRUAL t  = (Net income before extraordinary items t  - 
Cash flow from operations t ) / Total assets t-1




 All financial variables are calculated from annual financial statements.
ΔLEVER t = [Total long-term debt t  / (½Total assets t  + 
½Total assets t-1 ) ] - [Total long-term debt t-1  / (½Total 
assets t-1  + ½Total assets t-2 )]
If F_ΔLEVER t  < 0, then 1, 
otherwise 0
FSCORE = F_ROA + F_CFO + F_ΔROA +F_ACCRUAL + F_ΔLEVER + F_ΔLIQUID + 
EQ_OFFER + F_ΔMARGIN + F_ΔTURN
FSCORE
Change in liquidty
ΔLIQUID t  = (Total current assets t  / Total current 
liabilities t ) - (Total current assets t-1  / Total current 
liabilities t-1 )
If F_ΔLIQUID t  > 0, then 
1, otherwise 0
Equity offer EQ_OFFER t = Issuance of common equity t
If EQ_OFFER t  = 0, then 
1, otherwise 0
Change in asset turnover
ΔTURN t = Total sales t  / (½Total assets t  + ½Total assets t-
1 ) - Total sales t-1  / (½Total assets t-1  + ½Total assets t-2 )
If F_ΔTURN t  > 0, then 1, 
otherwise 0
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The variables used in FSCORE have a very intuitive interpretation in fundamental 
analysis. Profitability measures return on assets (ROA), change in return on assets (ΔROA) 
and cash flow from operations (CFO) provide information about firm’s overall profita-
bility, cash flow generation and earnings trend, whereas accruals (ACCRUAL) considers 
firm’s cash conversion and earnings quality. It is assumed that profitability measures have 
predictive power regarding firm’s future financial performance and thus positive relation 
with shareholder value creation. Financial leverage and liquidity measures focus on firm’s 
financial risk and include change in leverage (ΔLEVER), change in liquidity (ΔLIQUID) 
and equity issuance (EQ_OFFER). These measures assume that increase (decrease) in 
leverage (liquidity) and issuance of common equity when stock price is low is negative 
for equity holders as it may signal that the firm’s internal cash flow generation is insuffi-
cient to cover future operative needs, debt obligations and dividend payments.10 The third 
category of financial measures relates to trend in firm’s operating efficiency and includes 
a change in gross margin (ΔMARGIN) and asset turnover (ΔTURN). These variables sig-
nal various aspects such as firm’s pricing power, cost efficiency, product mix and produc-
tivity of the asset base. Overall, the FSCORE variables seem to be well in line with a 
fundamental analysis that seeks to select value stocks with improving fundamentals in-
stead of value stocks that continue to be distressed. However, as the FSCORE is an ag-
gregate binary measure and the variables have been chosen rather intuitively, it is likely 
that FSCORE strategy eliminates some useful information. In addition, as firms’ financial 
characteristics can vary significantly, the interpretation of the signals can be problematic. 
(Piotroski 2000, 7, 9–10.) Lastly, industry contextual information could be useful in 
benchmarking fundamental strength (Piotroski & So 2012, 2870). 
The empirical results from Piotroski (2000) study show that FSCORE can indeed be 
useful to separate winners from losers among value stocks. Using a one-year holding pe-
riod, the high FSCORE firms (score 8-9) outperform the low FSCORE firms (score 0-1) 
in 18 out of 21 years in the sample period between 1976 and 1996.11 The mean annual 
market-adjusted return is 13.4% for high FSCORE firms compared to -9.6% for low 
FSCORE firms – a significant difference of 23.0% annually with a t-statistics of 5.590. 
The high FSCORE firms also outperform the whole sample of value stocks as the return 
difference is impressive at 7.5% annually with t-statistics of 3.140. Besides the higher 
returns, the FSCORE strategy also shifts the return distribution to the right. The 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile, 75th percentile and 90th percentile returns are clearly higher 
for high FSCORE firms compared to low FSCORE firms and all value stocks. The pro-
portion of stocks earning positive market-adjusted returns also increases from 43.7% for 
                                                 
10 Issuance of common equity relates closely to the pecking order theory and information asymmetry be-
tween management and investors. According to the pecking order theory, firms prefer internal financing 
over debt and equity financing. Hence, equity financing is only used as a last resort. (Myers 1984, 581.) 
11 The results are also robust using a two-year holding period. 
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all value stocks to 50.0% for high FSCORE stocks. Similar results were also found by 
Aspris et al. (2013) in Australia between 2000 and 2010. They found that high FSCORE 
firms produced a mean market-adjusted return of 15.9%, compared with -27.2% and 8.1% 
for low FSCORE firms and all value stocks respectively. Also, the high FSCORE strategy 
shifts the return distribution to the right. However, the sample period used by Aspris et 
al. (2013) was relatively short and included only 369 firms. There is also contradicting 
evidence regarding FSCORE. Using a sample of US stocks from 2000 to 2013, Hanson 
and Dhanuka (2015) showed that various financial quality strategies have lost their ability 
to generate abnormal returns over one- to five-year holding periods. Only high ROIC 
strategy generates statistically significant alpha, which is not the case for FSCORE, gross 
profit-to-assets, accruals and Grantham’s score. Further, one- to five-year persistence in 
higher financial quality does not generate significant alpha except for ROIC. This could 
reflect that the excess returns previously associated with various fundamental strategies 
have been mostly arbitraged away (Hanson & Dhanuka 2015, 77). 
Continuing with Piotroski’s (2000) original results, the FSCORE strategy was also 
found to be more robust among small and medium market capitalization stocks with low 
trading volumes and limited analyst coverage. Piotroski (2000) found that small and me-
dium size stocks with high FSCORE earned 8.8% and 7.1% more than the average small 
and medium size value stock, whereas the comparable figure for large stocks was only 
1.7%. The results by Aspris et al. (2013) were also similar to Piotroski’s (2000) as the 
higher returns for the FSCORE strategy were driven by small and medium-sized firms, 
and were highest among stocks with the lowest turnover. This indicates that the higher 
returns earned by fundamentally strong small and medium-sized value stocks could be 
driven by limited information dissemination (Piotroski 2000, 3). This is logical as large 
stocks are more followed by analysts and traded by institutional investors, making mis-
pricing less likely. However, as small stocks consisted almost 60% of the whole sample 
in Piotroski’s (2000) study, the FSCORE strategy is likely to be unimplementable for 
most of institutional investors due to liquidity issues.  
Finally, Piotroski’s (2000) results do not support the argument that the higher return 
earned by the FSCORE strategy is due to risk-based explanations or correlation with other 
return patterns. Firstly, the high FSCORE firms are fundamentally strongest ex ante and 
there is a small variation in B/M ratios and market capitalizations. Hence, financial dis-
tress or B/M ratios and size are unlikely to explain the significant return difference be-
tween high and low FSCORE firms. (Piotroski 2000, 22.) Secondly, even after using size, 
B/M ratio, momentum, accrual, equity offering and FSCORE as control variables in cross-
sectional regressions, the average coefficient on FSCORE is still 0.032 with a t-statistics 
of 5.889. Thus, a one-point increase in FSCORE is associated with approximately 3.2% 
increase in market-adjusted return even after controlling for other return patterns. Based 
32 
on the above-mentioned results, it seems that FSCORE is a useful strategy for selecting 
winner value stocks as market does not recognize these signals (Piotroski 2000, 3). 
According to Duong et al. (2014), a potential explanation for the success of FSCORE 
could be the confirmation bias. The confirmation bias suggests that investors misinterpret 
information to endorse their prior beliefs. Therefore, if investors are overly pessimistic 
about value stocks, they can underreact (overreact) to positive (negative) fundamental 
information as it is incongruent with their prior view. (Duong et al. 2014, 528.) Using 
data from the UK from 1991 to 2007, Duong et al. (2013) find support for the confirma-
tion bias hypothesis among value stocks. Specifically, value stocks with high FSCORE 
earn positive market-adjusted returns, whereas value stocks with low FSCORE earn neg-
ative market-adjusted returns.  Although the negative market-adjusted return for the low 
FSCORE portfolio is not statistically significant, the high-low return of 11.25% is clearly 
statistically significant with t-statistics of 4.276 and is more driven by the long positions 
in financially strong value stocks. This suggest that the bias is stronger among value 
stocks with positive fundamental information, supporting the conclusion that the abnor-
mal returns are driven by the confirmation bias (Duong et al. 2014, 539). 
2.2.4 Combining growth and fundamentals – Mohanram GSCORE 
Although fundamental analysis is more common among value stocks due to their financial 
characteristics, it can also be applied to growth stocks. Whereas fundamental analysis in 
value stocks often focuses in capital structure, ability to meet debt service obligations and 
liquidity, in growth stocks analysing sustainability of growth might be more important. 
(Beneish et al. 2001, 165–166). The effectiveness of fundamental analysis in growth con-
text is, however, not that unambiguous. Growth firms tend to be more followed by ana-
lysts and traded by institutional investors, have often many other disclosures than finan-
cial statements and non-financial metrics can be even more important than financials. 
However, these attributes can also cause growth stocks to be overvalued as investors 
overreact to intangible information and past performance and ignore useful information 
in financial statements. (Mohanram 2005, 134.) Therefore, if current fundamentals pro-
vide information about the future and are misinterpreted by the market, growth stocks 
with strong fundamentals could outperform growth stocks with weak fundamentals. 
To see whether fundamental analysis could be useful among growth stocks, Mohanram 
(2005) developed the GSCORE to separate winners from losers among low B/M stocks. 
Whereas FSCORE uses financial measures suited for value stocks based on firm’s histor-
ical financial development, GSCORE uses measures in an industry context which have 
been tailored for growth firms. In GSCORE there are eight signals/variables from finan-
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cial statements that measure three areas: (1) Earnings and cash flow profitability, (2) Na-
ïve extrapolation and (3) Accounting conservatism. As in the FSCORE, the GSCORE 
signals are binary and are aggregated into a single measure to separate strong growth 
firms from weak ones. Although GSCORE also includes traditional signals focusing on 
profitability, cash flows and accruals (G1, G2 and G3), there are several important dis-
tinctions.12 Firstly, GSCORE includes signals for naïve extrapolation (G4 and G5) and 
accounting conservatism (G6, G7 and G8) that are not part of FSCORE. There is evidence 
that investors tend to naively extrapolate growth firms’ past sales and earnings growth 
into the future and that firms with more stable fundamentals tend to on average perform 
better in the future. Hence, distinguishing firms with stable historical sales and earnings 
growth from firms which are overvalued as investors extrapolate growth rates too far into 
the future could improve portfolio returns. In addition, conservative accounting relating 
to R&D expenditures, capital expenditures and advertising expenditures is likely to lower 
earnings in the short-term and thus book value, but could potentially lead to higher than 
expected future sales and earnings growth in the future. (Mohanram 2005, 139–140.) Sec-
ondly, GSCORE compares all variables except accruals to firm’s industry median values, 
whereas FSCORE focuses on firm’s own historical development. Thus, the GSCORE as-
sumes implicitly that firms with above the industry median values are likely to perform 
better in the future. This kind of industry contextual information is commonly used in 
practice and could enhance fundamental analysis as firms in the same industry often share 
similar operating, financial and risk characteristics. 
The empirical results show that GSCORE is useful for separating winners from losers 
among growth stocks. Growth firms with high GSCORE (score 6-8) earn on average size-
adjusted return of 3.1% annually, whereas low GSCORE (score 0-1) firms earn a signifi-
cant negative average return of -17.5%. The high GSCORE firms also outperform the 
whole sample as the average annual size-adjusted return is -8.7% for all growth firms. 
The positive size-adjusted returns are particularly strong for growth firms with GSCORE 
of 7 or 8 as these firms earn an average annual size-adjusted return of 6.8% and 11.4%. 
However, these firms consist only 4.2% of the total sample compared to 9.8% and 12.9% 
for firms with GSCORE of 6 (mean return of 1.3%) and 0 or 1 (mean returns of -19.1% 
and -17.0%). Thus, the significant average annual return of 20.6% (t-statistics of 10.41) 
for high-low GSCORE strategy is mainly due to the extremely weak performance of low 
GSCORE firms. This could limit effectiveness of the strategy if there are restrictions on 
short-selling as the strategy relies more on shorting/eliminating weak growth stocks (Mo-
hanram 2005, 148).13 Similar to the FSCORE strategy, the GSCORE strategy also shifts 
                                                 
12 Accruals is the only signal that does not correlate positively with future returns. As growth firms often 
have negative accruals due to increasing working capital requirements and depreciation, it could be that 
accruals component is less important for growth stocks than for value stocks (Mohanram 2005, 144).  
13 Mohanram (2005) also addresses issues relating to shorting stocks such as liquidity and availability of 
put options, and finds evidence that positive returns could be achieved. 
34 
the return distribution. High GSCORE earn higher returns than low GSCORE firms or all 
growth firms in each percentile group, and the proportion of stocks earning positive re-
turns increases from 34.6% for all growth stocks to 45.8% for high GSCORE stocks. 
The GSCORE strategy is also robust for growth stocks across time, controlling for 
other return patterns and using FSCORE strategy for growth stocks. High GSCORE firms 
outperform low GSCORE firms in 21 out of 23 years (of which 16 were statistically sig-
nificant) and in almost each year the return difference is more than 10% (Mohanram 2005, 
156). When using size, B/M ratio, momentum, accruals, equity offering and GSCORE as 
control variables, the average coefficient for GSCORE is 0.034 with t-statistics of 5.53. 
What is even more interesting is the usefulness of contextual fundamental analysis. The 
GSCORE does not work well with value stocks, and FSCORE does not work as well with 
growth stocks as with value stocks. In both cases, the returns for high-low strategies are 
much lower and there is a limited number of firms in extreme portfolios, which reduces 
effectiveness of the strategy (Mohanram 2005, 165–166.) According to Mohanram 
(2005), there could be two explanations why FSCORE does not work well with growth 
stocks. Firstly, as growth firms’ fundamentals are on average unstable compared to value 
firms, it might be that extrapolation of these fundamentals does not work well among 
growth stocks. Secondly, as information dissemination is more effective among growth 
stocks, mispricing relating to fundamentals might be rather small. (Mohanram 2005, 166.) 
It could also be that FSCORE signals are not suitable for growth stocks as these signals 
focus on finding value stocks that are likely to recover from financial distress. In the end, 
Mohanram (2005, 167) argues that the success of fundamental analysis among value 
stocks is due to mispricing as investors ignore relevant fundamental information, whereas 
misinterpretation seems to be the key reason for growth stocks. Although Mohanram’s 
(2005) results emphasize the importance of tailored signals for value and growth stocks, 
contradicting results have also been found as Duong et al. (2014, 537) found that both 
FSCORE and GSCORE strategies worked in value and growth context. 
2.3 The momentum effect 
2.3.1 Evidence from momentum premium 
The efficient market hypothesis argues that past stock prices cannot predict future returns. 
However, there exists strong and persistent evidence that past 3 to 12-month stock returns 
can be used to predict future stock returns and this effect is generally known as medium-
term/intermediate-term momentum. This evidence contradicts even the weakest form of 
the efficient market hypothesis, which makes momentum a puzzling anomaly. 
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Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) were one of the first researchers to show evidence that 
buying past winners and selling past losers could create significant positive returns in the 
US between 1965 and 1989. They examine relative strength portfolios formed based on 
3 to 12-month historical returns for 3 to 12-month holding periods and find that returns 
for all except one, winners minus losers portfolios are positive and statistically significant. 
The highest average monthly return of 1.31% is achieved when stocks are selected based 
on the past 12 months’ performance and are hold for 3 months. The results also show that 
momentum returns do not last for longer than 12 months. Using 6-month lagged returns, 
the average monthly returns are positive for each first 12 months following portfolio for-
mation, but are negative for each month in the second year and half of the year in the third 
year. This is consistent with the long-term return reversal suggested by De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) where past long-term winners (losers) underperform (outperform) past los-
ers (winners). Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) argue that this is not driven by higher sys-
tematic risk but by biased expectations. It is possible that investors underreact to short-
term positive prospects, driving abnormal returns in the first 12 months. Following the 
abnormal returns in the short-term, the returns mean-revert in the later period as investors 
have overreacted to long-term prospects. (Jegadeesh & Titman 1993, 90.) 
Since the findings by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) the term momentum was officially 
conceptualized and it has been found to be a persistent anomaly also in international mar-
kets. Rouwenhorst (1998) studied momentum in 12 European countries between 1980 
and 1995. Similarly to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Rouwenhorst (1998) finds a strong 
medium-term momentum with similar continuity pattern. All portfolios with long in past 
winners and short in past losers produce positive returns and are statistically significant 
irrespective of the look-back period used for ranking and holding period (both between 3 
to 12 months). The highest average monthly return of 1.35% is again achieved with a 
portfolio using 12-month historical returns and 3-month holding period. Although aver-
age momentum returns are positive for all holding periods, these returns tend to decrease 
when moving from 3-month holding period to 12-month holding period (Rouwenhorst 
1998, 269). For example, the average monthly return is only 0.64% when using a 3-month 
look-back period and a 12-month holding period. The monthly momentum returns also 
turn to negative at the end of the first year and continue to be negative in the second year, 
indicating that momentum premium cannot be captured using over a 12-month buy-and-
hold strategy. Interestingly, the momentum effect also seems to be stronger for smallest 
firms as smaller momentum firms (deciles 1-2) earn on average 1.45–1.65% per month 
compared to 0.73–1.02% per month for largest momentum firms (deciles 8-10). 
Momentum effect has also been studied with a more extensive international country 
sample. Griffin, Xiuqing and Spencer (2003) study momentum effect in 39 countries be-
sides the US across Americas, Europe, Asia and Africa. They use a 6-month look-back 
and a holding period and report an overall significant momentum across the international 
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markets. Excluding Africa (country sample size only two), the momentum effect is 
strongest in Americas (excluding the US) and Europe, where the average monthly mo-
mentum returns are 0.78% and 0.77%. Interestingly, momentum profits are not statisti-
cally significant in emerging markets and in Asia even if Japan is excluded (Griffin et al. 
2003, 2522). The weak momentum effect in Asia is not, however, an exception as it has 
been documented by many other researchers. For example, Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) 
report negative average monthly momentum returns in Japan, Korea and Taiwan between 
1984 and 2003. The positive momentum returns are also statistically insignificant in 
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. More re-
cently, Fama and French (2012) and Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) report a 
positive momentum premium in each international region studied over a long sample pe-
riod (strongest in Europe), but the premium is small and statistically insignificant in Ja-
pan. Hence, there can be significant regional differences in momentum returns. Griffin, 
Xiuqing and Spencer (2003) also show that momentum profits tend to reverse after the 
end of first year, which is in line with findings by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and 
Rouwenhorst (1998). The momentum effect seems to be strongest during the first six 
months after portfolio formation and is positive in each region (on average 0.66% per 
month globally), but turns to negative in each single region and month in the second year. 
Overall, based on the above described empirical evidence, it seems that momentum pre-
mium is significant over intermediate term particularly in developed markets (excluding 
Japan), exhibits a strong short-term continuation as positive momentum returns continue 
on average around 12-months from the portfolio formation, and produces higher returns 
with a shorter rebalance frequency. 
2.3.2 Drivers for intermediate-term momentum returns 
Explanations for momentum anomaly are even more controversial and miscellaneous 
than for value. There are both risk-based and behavioural explanations for momentum 
anomaly. Risk-based explanations such as the three-factor model do not, however, seem 
to explain the large and continuing short-term returns associated with momentum. The 
three-factor model does not appear to capture the momentum returns as intercepts are 
clearly different from zero for both short-term losers and winners and the model predicts 
revisions of returns for past short-term winners and losers (Fama & French 1996, 68). 
According to Chui, Titman and Wei (2010, 361), the documented annual momentum pre-
mium of around 12% both in the US and Europe seems to be too large to be explained 
with higher systematic risk. Although researchers have proposed other risk-based models 
based on firm-specific attributes, it appears that behavioural explanations for momentum 
anomaly have become increasingly more popular. 
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One of the most common behavioural explanations for momentum anomaly is underre-
action hypothesis. According to the hypotheses, stock prices underreact to various funda-
mental information such as earnings. This causes information to be incorporated gradu-
ally into prices, resulting in positive momentum returns in the short-term. (Barberis et al. 
1998, 307–308.) Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) show that both past returns 
(price momentum) and earnings surprises (earnings momentum) predict future returns 
over the next 6 and 12 months.14 Stocks with high (low) past six-month returns and pos-
itive (negative) earnings surprises continue to earn positive returns and analysts are slow 
to revise their earnings expectations. Hence, investors tend to underreact to new infor-
mation, leading to momentum returns. (Chan et al. 1996, 1693.) When price and earnings 
momentum are studied jointly, return spreads are positive and widest between jointly 
ranked high and low category portfolios. Both price and earnings momentum also have 
separate explanatory power when controlling for each other, indicating that they exploit 
different information that market is only gradually taking into account. Positive returns 
associated with price momentum are, however, higher and longer-lived than for earnings 
momentum. This might reflect large and gradual revisions by market participants instead 
of focus on short-term earnings, resulting in persistent drift in returns. (Chan et al. 1996, 
1695, 1697, 1970.) Chan et al. (1996) also test risk-based explanations using the three-
factor model and downside risk as a proxy for systematic risk. Risk-based models do not 
seem to be a plausible explanation as regression intercepts are clearly statistically differ-
ent from zero and positive momentum stocks outperform negative momentum stocks in 
months when the overall index underperforms. 
Similar results were also found by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000). They studied momen-
tum from a firm-specific information diffusion view with a hypothesis that stocks with 
lower information dissemination should exhibit stronger momentum returns. To test this 
hypothesis, they used firm market capitalization and analyst coverage as a proxy for in-
formation dissemination. This approach is rather similar to that of Piotroski (2000) who 
argued that lower information dissemination among small firms contributes to value pre-
mium. The results by Hong et al. (2000) support the hypothesis. Firstly, momentum strat-
egy is on average more profitable among smaller market capitalization stocks. Although 
momentum strategy is not profitable among microcap stocks, there is a rather monotonic 
negative relation between size and momentum returns when moving past the smallest 
stocks. This relation is particularly strong among the largest stocks where momentum 
returns are not statistically different from zero. Secondly, stocks with low analyst cover-
age have higher momentum returns. The difference is significant as momentum returns 
are 1.13% for stocks with low analyst coverage compared to 0.72% for stocks with high 
analyst coverage. The third key finding is that the relation between momentum returns 
                                                 
14 Chan et al. (1996) use various earning surprise measures including abnormal returns around earnings, 
standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) and analyst revisions. 
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and analyst coverage is driven by loser (low) momentum stocks with a low analyst cov-
erage. Thus, negative information dissemination appears to be weaker among loser 
stocks, which drives momentum returns between stocks with low and high analyst cover-
age. (Hong et al. 2000, 279.) All in all, the results by Hong et al. (2000) seem to support 
the underreaction hypothesis as momentum strategies work better with firms that have 
small market cap and low analyst coverage. 
The underreaction to information could also relate to disposition effect as suggested 
by Frazzini (2006). According to the disposition effect, investors tend to sell stocks that 
have gone up and keep stocks that have gone down. This tendency can contribute to mo-
mentum profits as investors underreact to information, which increases (decreases) future 
returns for stocks that have gone up (down). (Frazzini 2006, 2018–2019.) To test this 
hypothesis, Frazzini (2006) uses data from mutual fund holdings and constructs long-
short portfolios based on a proxy for unrealized capital gains (losses). Stocks with positive 
(negative) capital gain overhang underreact to positive (negative) news, predicting posi-
tive (negative) future stock returns for stocks with capital gains (losses) (Frazzini 2006, 
2028). The results show that disposition effect seems to predict momentum returns as 
stocks with positive (negative) earnings announcements and with high capital gains 
(losses) overhang produce positive (negative) future returns. The long-short strategy that 
goes long for stocks with positive earnings news and positive capital gain overhang and 
short for stocks with negative earnings news and negative capital gain overhang produces 
abnormal returns over 1- to 12-month holding periods. Thus, information seems to travel 
slowly across capital gain/loss portfolios, resulting in underreaction and momentum prof-
its (Frazzini 2006, 2030). These results are further supported by the three-factor regres-
sions as intercepts are statistically significant for long-short portfolios, meaning that sys-
tematic risk factors do not explain the large overhang spread (Frazzini 2006, 2035). 
Hur, Pritamani and Sharma (2010) study disposition effect and momentum returns 
from a different standpoint. As individual investors are more likely to suffer from dispo-
sition effect, Hur et al. (2010, 1156) argue that disposition effect should better predict 
momentum profits among stocks with greater individual investor ownership and share of 
trading volumes. When portfolios are first sorted based on past returns and capital gains 
overhang, results confirm earlier results by Frazzini (2006). In each past return category, 
the average monthly returns of high minus low capital gains overhang portfolios are pos-
itive regardless of the individual investors ownership, supporting the disposition effect as 
a driver for momentum effect (Hur et al. 2010, 1162). When portfolios are further sorted 
according to individual investors ownership, momentum portfolios with higher individual 
investor ownership produce statistically higher returns for 1, 3 and 6-month ranking and 
holding periods. Hence, momentum returns driven by the disposition effect are larger 
when there is a higher individual investor ownership (Hur et al. 2010, 1165). This is also 
somewhat in line with the evidence in the US by Hong et al. (2000) and globally by Fama 
39 
and French (2012) that momentum returns are stronger among small cap stocks as small 
stocks are more likely to be owned by private investors.15  
Momentum profits can also relate to seasonality. Sias (2007) studies seasonality 
caused by tax-loss selling and window dressing hypotheses. According to the tax-loss 
selling hypothesis, investors prefer to sell losers and avoid selling winners in December 
to optimize tax benefits. In the case of window dressing hypothesis, institutional investors 
want to sell stocks that have underperformed, which are replaced by buying stocks that 
have performed well. This kind of window-dressing is done prior the quarter-ends (par-
ticularly before the year-end) to improve portfolios’ appearance to investors. Both hy-
potheses should thus contribute to higher momentum returns at the quarter-ending 
months. In addition, these effects should be stronger among institutional investors and 
during the latter part of the sample period as institutional investors’ share of trading and 
ownership has increased. (Sias 2007, 48.) The results give strong support for both hy-
potheses. In the later period from 1984 to 2004 average momentum profits for quarter-
ending months are 3.10% compared to 0.59% for non-quarter-ending months even when 
January is excluded.16 In contrast, momentum returns are virtually the same for non-quar-
ter-ending months excluding January and for quarter-ending months in the earlier period 
from 1963 to 1984. The momentum returns are also clearly strongest in December at 
5.52%, giving support to both tax-loss selling and window dressing hypotheses (Sias 
2007, 50). Compared to the evidence by Sias (2007), Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) 
found strong momentum returns in December only in high tax regimes. Therefore, the 
tax-loss selling hypothesis was a more prominent driver for the strong momentum returns 
in December than window-dressing (Grinblatt & Moskowitz 2004, 543). However, as 
results by Sias (2007) show higher momentum returns also in other quarter-ending 
months, it seems difficult to conclude that window-dressing does not play a role in mo-
mentum anomaly. The final tests by Sias (2007) also show that institutional investors are 
likely to contribute significantly to momentum profits. Firstly, momentum returns are 
2.53% per month during all months for stocks with high institutional ownership and 
0.91% for stocks with low institutional ownership. Secondly, momentum profits are more 
than double for stocks with high institutional ownership in quarter-ending months (5.82% 
per month) compared to stocks with low institutional ownership (2.73% per month). The 
significant return spread is primarily driven by the last two sub-periods 1990–1997 and 
1997–2003, supporting the hypothesis that institutional investors role in driving momen-
tum returns has become more important (Sias 2007, 52). 
                                                 
15 It could also be that the positive relation between momentum returns and individual investor ownership 
is due to higher individualism among these private investors as suggested by Chui et al. (2010). 
16 It is assumed that tax-motivated trading reverts at the beginning of the year, which causes negative mo-
mentum returns in January. The results by Sias (2007) support this assumption as momentum returns are 
over 10% negative in January between 1984 and 2004.  
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2.3.3 Enhancing intermediate-term momentum strategies 
As with value effect, the question that arises is how could we further improve traditional 
momentum returns? According to Gray and Vogel (2016, 93), one way is to focus on the 
time-series characteristics of momentum returns. The argument is that investors should 
avoid momentum stocks with lottery characteristics. That is, momentum profits could be 
enhanced by selecting momentum stocks with smoother returns in the ranking period as 
these stocks are less likely to be mispriced compared to momentum stocks with jumpy 
price paths. (Gray & Vogel 2016, 99.) Thus, the key argument here is that by looking at 
the time-series characteristics of momentum stocks, we can improve momentum portfo-
lios returns by selecting undervalued momentum stocks and by eliminating overvalued 
momentum stocks that have performed well due to investors’ expectation errors.  
The idea of eliminating momentum stocks with lottery characteristics is followed by 
Da, Gurun and Warachka (2014). Investors’ limited cognitive resources causes investors 
to underreact to frequent and gradual information. Instead, investors appear to pay more 
attention to large-scale events that are infrequent by nature. (Da et al. 2014, 2171–2172.) 
Da et al. (2014, 2172) develop a frog-in-the-pan hypothesis that predicts investors’ un-
derreaction to continuous and small information compared to discrete and large infor-
mation. To test this hypothesis, Da et al. (2014, 2177) construct information discreteness 
(ID) measure, or 𝐼𝐷 = 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑇)×[%𝑛𝑒𝑔 − %𝑝𝑜𝑠], that tries to capture whether mo-
mentum returns are driven by continuous or discrete information. In the ID measure, 
higher past 12-month momentum returns (PRET) and percentage of positive daily returns 
(%pos) compared to negative returns (%neg) indicate that momentum is driven by small 
and continuous information. Hence, the lower the value of ID measure, the stronger the 
momentum signal as it is resulting from small and frequent return signals (Da et al. 2014, 
2172). To test the hypothesis, Da et al. (2014) use a long sample period in the US from 
1927 to 2007 and double-sort portfolios first by traditional momentum measure i.e. PRET 
and then by ID. The results are consistent with the hypothesis as the long-short returns in 
the 6-month holding period increase monotonically when moving from high ID portfolio 
to low ID portfolios. Both raw return and the three-factor model adjusted return spreads 
are considerably large and statistically significant as high ID portfolios earn -2.07% and 
-2.01% compared to 5.94% and 8.77% for low ID portfolios. Moreover, momentum re-
turns persist significantly longer in low ID portfolios. Continuous momentum portfolios 
produce statistically significant three-factor alpha for 8 months after portfolio formation, 
whereas the comparable figure for discrete portfolios is only 3 months. (Da et al. 2014, 
2183.) It thus seems that investors underreact systematically to continuous positive infor-
mation and thus momentum returns can be enhanced by separating strong momentum 
stocks with continuous information from weak ones with discrete information. 
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Fundamental analysis is still rarely used together with momentum anomaly. Momen-
tum anomaly is based on past returns, whereas firm-specific fundamentals have not been 
used that much in separating winners from losers among momentum stocks (Chen et al. 
2016, 224). Using fundamentals to enhance portfolio returns seems to be more popular in 
value strategy due to the financial characteristics of value stocks. However, if momentum 
stocks are also mispriced due to investors’ expectation errors, could it be that fundamental 
analysis is also useful in momentum investing framework? Specifically, what if part of 
stocks with momentum signals are undervalued as investors are not giving enough cred-
ibility for improving fundamentals? Continuing with the same logic, part of momentum 
stocks could be overvalued as investors have bid prices past intrinsic value. In this case, 
separating winners from losers using fundamental analysis could also enhance momen-
tum portfolios returns in a similar manner as in the value framework. Although this is not 
directly stated by Chen et al. (2016), they combine both fundamental analysis and mo-
mentum strategy to see if momentum returns can be improved. They form long-short 
strategy using both past 12-month cumulative returns and fundamental strength based on 
FSCORE and GSCORE. The results give strong support for combining stocks with strong 
momentum signal and fundamental strength. Going long for stocks with highest past re-
turns (QM5) and highest FSCORE (QF5) and short for stocks with lowest past returns 
(QM1) and lowest FSCORE (QF1) produces abnormal returns that are statistically signif-
icant irrespective of holding period length. The average monthly returns vary from 1.05% 
to 1.56% and are highest (lowest) for 3-month (12-month) holding period. More im-
portantly, the combined momentum and FSCORE strategy outperforms the traditional 
momentum strategy in each holding period by 0.42% to 0.53% per month. These results 
are also similar and statistically significant using GSCORE, but fundamental momentum 
strategy that uses FSCORE produces more significant returns.17  
It is also worthy to point out that combining momentum and value can be a powerful 
way to enhance portfolio’s risk and return characteristics. Asness, Moskowitz and Peder-
sen (2013) find a significant negative correlation of around -0.60 between momentum and 
value strategies. This is in line with the earlier evidence by Asness (1997) that the value 
effect is strongest among low momentum stocks and that the momentum effect is strong-
est among growth stocks. This seems natural as value stocks often have poor historical 
fundamentals, resulting in low historical returns and thus higher B/M ratios. On the other 
hand, growth stocks are often companies that have increased revenues and earnings rap-
idly, translating into higher historical returns and thus B/M ratios. The high excess returns 
earned by momentum and value strategies and their inverse relation indicate that combin-
ing these strategies is likely enhance the risk-return characteristics of the portfolio. Fol-
lowing this logic, Asness et al. (2013) show that a simple equal 50/50 combination of 
                                                 
17 FSCORE and GSCORE also produce abnormal returns in the traditional value-growth context, which 
supports the earlier results by Piotroski (2000), Mohanram (2005) and Piotroski and So (2012). 
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pure-play value and momentum portfolios produces superior risk adjusted returns meas-
ured by the Sharpe ratio across international markets. Thus, combining pure-play value 
and momentum strategies can produce significant diversification benefits. 
2.3.4 Implementability under trading costs 
Momentum is more a short-term strategy compared to value. Whereas value portfolios 
are often rebalanced annually, momentum portfolios tend to produce higher returns with 
a shorter rebalance frequency. As most academic studies focus on gross returns, it natu-
rally raises the doubt of whether momentum strategy can be profitable net of transaction 
costs. (Gray & Vogel 2013, 58–59.) As implementing momentum strategy can be costly, 
a more realistic version of the strategy should consider whether marginal benefits exceed 
the marginal costs. If arbitrage costs exceed momentum profits, it can delay the price 
adjustment towards intrinsic value and thus increase the persistence of momentum anom-
aly. (Lesmond et al. 2004, 350.) 
The profitability of momentum strategies under transaction costs has been questioned 
by Lesmond et al. (2004). Long-short momentum strategies are trading intensive as they 
require frequent opening and closing of positions and incur various trading costs includ-
ing bid-ask spread, taxes, short-sale costs and holding period risk. Further, long-short 
momentum strategies are often tilted towards unprofitable, smaller and illiquid stocks, 
meaning that short-sale costs can be high and using a simple trade-weighted measure as 
a proxy for trading costs is likely to be misleading. (Lesmond et al. 2004, 350–351.) Les-
mond et al. (2004) take these issues into account and test momentum strategies profita-
bility after trading costs. The results show that the average momentum profits range from 
4.74% to 8.90% over a 6-month holding period before trading costs. When trading costs 
and actual turnover are taken into account, the momentum profits decline substantially; 
the momentum profits are only between -2.47% and 2.20% and are statistically insignif-
icant. Lesmond et al. (2004, 369) argue that momentum strategies are dependent on stocks 
with high trading costs and estimate that the one-way trading costs are between 1.9-2.8%, 
which prevents the profitable implementation of momentum strategies net of transaction 
costs. Trading costs of momentum strategies also relate to the size of the position taken. 
Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) test profitability of momentum strategies using both propor-
tional trading costs such as commissions and spreads, as well as non-proportional trading 
costs caused by the price impact of taken momentum trades. They estimate that abnormal 
returns for momentum strategies vanish after initial investment of around USD 4.5-5.0 
billion, which is the implied break-even size for a momentum fund. 
The results by Lesmond et al. (2004) and Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) have recently 
been challenged by Frazzini, Israel and Moskowitz (2015). Frazzini et al. (2015) use over 
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a trillion dollars of real trading data from institutional investors across 21 markets from 
1998 to 2013, increasing the credibility of their results. Frazzini et al. (2015) find that 
momentum strategies are robust after transaction costs and that they can be implemented 
profitably at a significantly larger scale both in the US and internationally.18 They esti-
mate that the average annual realized costs for long-short momentum strategies are 3.03% 
and 2.24% in the US and internationally respectively, well-below the previously esti-
mated trading costs. The momentum strategy also outperforms both value and size strat-
egies net of transaction costs in the US and Europe. Although trading costs for momentum 
strategy are significantly larger due to higher turnover and market price impact costs, the 
momentum premium is sufficiently large to make the strategy a winner. Frazzini et al. 
(2015, 30) argue that their estimates are better proxies for true trading costs for institu-
tional investors as they use real trading and cost data from institutional investors, whereas 
in previous studies the estimated trading costs are based on average investors. Further, 
due to lower annual trading costs, the estimated break-even sizes for momentum portfo-
lios are larger than by Korajczyk and Sadka (2004). Frazzini et al. (2015, 31) find that the 
momentum portfolio break-even size is USD 56.2 billion in the US based on the annual 
momentum premium of 8.20% which is more than 10 times the break-even size suggested 
by Korajczyk and Sadka (2004). It is, however, very difficult to believe that momentum 
strategy could actually be scaled up to USD 56.2 billion without a significant impact on 




                                                 
18 Frazzini et al. (2015) also find similar results for value and size effect. 
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3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data description 
The data used in the empirical part of this thesis is from Thomson Reuters Datastream 
and Kenneth R. French Data Library. The empirical part is conducted using data from 
stocks listed in the S&P Composite 1500 index, which combines three different indices: 
The S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600. The S&P 500, S&P 400 and 
S&P 600 indices measure the large-cap, mid-cap and small-cap segments of the US equity 
market respectively, and cover together approximately 91% of the US market capitaliza-
tion as at the end of November 2016 (S&P Composite 1500 Month-End Factsheet 2016). 
Therefore, the data should give a good proxy of the profitability of fundamental value and 
momentum strategies in the US. To calculate market-adjusted returns for each stock and 
portfolios, the S&P 1500 composite index is considered as a proxy for the market portfo-
lio. Further, to measure the risk-adjusted performance in the portfolio analysis, the Sharpe 
ratios, the CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor and the Carhart four-factor alphas are 
calculated when testing the robustness of the strategies. 
The sample period is from the beginning of July 1997 to the end of June 2015, which 
should be sufficient to study the investment strategies and includes various market events 
such as the tech bubble and the financial crisis. The key reason why we have chosen this 
time period is that we want to test combined investment strategies with a more recent data 
than Piotroski (2000) and Duong et al. (2014) following the widespread implementation 
of the latest electronic and automated trading systems and improved information availa-
bility. The data from Thomson Reuters Datastream contains monthly total returns and 
annual financial statement information for all stocks that constitute S&P Composite 1500 
index at the beginning of each investment period in July in year 𝑡. For each stock to be 
included in the sample, we required the following data: (1) Book-to-market ratio at the 
end of December, (2) raw total returns for the past 12 months, (3) market value at the end 
of June, (4) Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) by FTSE, and (5) all fiscal year-
end financials required for calculating the FS_SCORE. All stocks with incomplete data 
are excluded from portfolio formation in the year when data is not available. If a stock 
delists within one-year of portfolio formation, it is assumed that the delisting return is the 
last return provided by Datastream. Thus, as Datastream uses a constant total return value 
equal to the last valid data point after the stock delists, we assume that the delisting return 
of the stock is zero after the month the stock ceases trading. This is likely to cause a 
delisting return bias of some kind, which can be particularly problematic if the stock is 
delisted for performance-related reasons. We also exclude all firms with negative book-
to-market ratio in December and firms classified as financials or utilities according to the 
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ICB industry classification. Excluding financials and utilities is a common practice as 
firms in these industries often have vastly different financial statements, weakening the 
fundamental comparison of these firms relative to other industries.19 Further, each year 
we exclude all stocks below the 5th percentile in market value at the end of June to min-
imize potential issues arising from the most illiquid stocks. However, as empirical evi-
dence shows that value, momentum and fundamental investment strategies tend to pro-
duce higher returns among smaller stocks, we still want to include a comprehensive sam-
ple of small-sized stocks. 
The total sample of all stocks with required data consist of 18,747 firm-year observa-
tions across all investment years between 1997 and 2014. The total sample is used to sort 
out value and momentum stocks and construct fundamental value and momentum port-
folios for each holding period. As the total sample size is relatively large each year, it 
should partly mitigate the bias relating to delisting returns. Figure 1 below reports the 
annual firm-year observations varying between 997 and 1,083 stocks across the 18 in-
vestment years.  
 
 
Figure 1 Total firm-year observations across the investment years 
                                                 
19 For example, firms operating in the financial sector often have highly leveraged capital structures due to 
their business model (Fama & French 1992, 429). Thus, higher than average leverage across financial firms 
does not necessarily reflect financial distress. In addition, the financial ratios that are used to analyse finan-












3.2.1 Value and momentum measures 
As the literature review shows, there are various ways to compute both value and mo-
mentum for stocks. In this thesis, the most commonly used measures will be used. Alt-
hough other measures and enhancements could be applied, we want to form value and 
momentum portfolios in a simple and efficient manner to avoid data mining bias. Further, 
as value and momentum portfolios will be double-sorted using fundamental information, 
we are most interested in studying whether fundamental information can be used to en-
hance returns for value and momentum portfolios. 
Starting from the value measure, the firm-specific book-to-market ratio (B/M) will be 
used to form value portfolios. The book-to-market ratio will be calculated each year as 
the inverse of the market-to-book ratio provided by Datastream, which equals the firm’s 
book value of common equity (BE) divided by market value of equity (ME) both at the 
end of December in year 𝑡 − 1. As Datastream uses the book value and market value at 
the end of the last calendar quarter for all US stocks, the B/M ratio does not necessarily 
reflect the financial year-end B/M ratio for all stocks due to varying fiscal-year ends. To 
avoid the look-ahead bias, value portfolios are formed each year at the beginning of July 
in year 𝑡. This approach should ensure that all data required to calculate the B/M ratios is 
publicly available before calculating returns for stocks.20 
Continuing with momentum (MOM-12) measure, it will be calculated as the past 12-
month cumulative raw total return prior the portfolio formation at the beginning of July 
in year 𝑡, skipping the most recent month. Specifically, the momentum will be calculated 
as the cumulative total return (TR) of the stock during the 11-month period from month 
𝑡 − 11 to month 𝑡 − 1. We exclude the most recent month 𝑡 − 1 in calculating interme-
diate-term momentum to avoid the effect from short-term reversal in stock returns, which 
is commonly calculated as the one-month stock return (Bali et al. 2016, 208). The value 
and momentum measures of stock 𝑖 in year 𝑡 can now be written as 





   
 




                                                 
20 Hou et al. (2011, 2533) also use the market-to-book ratio (WC09304) from Worldscope to calculate the 
book-to-market ratio for US stocks and match the year-end financial statement data for year 𝑡 − 1 to returns 
from July in year 𝑡 to June of year 𝑡 + 1. 
47 
3.2.2 Enhanced Piotroski FSCORE – FS_SCORE 
As momentum investing is not directly growth investing (although momentum stocks are 
likely to be fundamentally closer to growth stocks) and there is evidence that combining 
FSCORE with momentum can produce economically and statistically significant abnor-
mal returns (see Chen et al. 2016), we are intrigued to test whether fundamentally strong 
momentum stocks outperform fundamentally weak momentum stocks. Further, we will 
also test the same among value stocks, where fundamentals are more commonly used to 
separate winners from losers. 
To separate winners from losers, we will use the FS_SCORE created by Gray and 
Carlisle (2013) to calculate the financial strength of each value and momentum stock. The 
FS_SCORE is very similar to the original FSCORE by Piotroski (2000) as it seeks to 
separate winners from losers among value stocks, but there are some important enhance-
ments. In the FS_SCORE, three of the original variables in the FSCORE have been mod-
ified and classified into three slightly different categories: (1) Current profitability, (2) 
Stability and (3) Recent operational improvements. There a total of 10 binary variables 
in the composite FS_SCORE compared to nine in the FSCORE and these are shown in 
table 3. As we use financial statement data from Datastream, we have to try to replicate 
the FS_SCORE variables in the best way possible. Although majority of the financials 
signals are relatively straightforward to replicate using Datastream, there are few excep-
tions. All financial statement items that have been downloaded from the Datastream to 
calculate FS_SCORE are shown in Appendix 1. 
In the current profitability category, there are three variables that are used to measure 
firm’s current profitability and cash flow generation. Variables ROA and ACCRUAL are 
the same as in FSCORE, but the variable cash flow from operations scaled by the begin-
ning of the year total assets (CFO) has been changed. Instead of using CFO, Gray and 
Carlisle (2013) use free cash flow scaled by total assets (FCFTA). This can be seen as a 
relevant improvement as FCFTA takes into account capital expenditures that are neces-
sary to maintain and expand future cash flows. For example, a firm may have a strong 
cash conversion and thus operating cash flow, but operates in an industry which requires 
high capital expenditures, increasing the need for continuous investments to maintain 
cash flows. Also, if the firm has a weak free cash flow profile, this is likely to increase 
the need for external debt and equity financing, which are negative fundamental signals. 
FCFTA has also a more robust connection to the intrinsic valuation of a firm as the enter-
prise (equity) value of a firm equals the present value of future free cash flows to the firm 
(equity). We calculate FCFTA in a similar manner as Gray and Carlisle (2013) and Novy-
Marx (2013) taking net income before extraordinary items and preferred dividends plus 
depreciation and amortization (including depletion) minus changes in working capital 
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minus capital expenditures, scaled by the beginning of the year total assets. Like CFO, 
FCFTA is defined as one if FCFTA is positive and otherwise zero.  
Table 3 FS_SCORE variable definitions 
 
The stability category is otherwise identical to leverage, liquidity, and source of funds 
category in FSCORE, but the equity issuance variable (EQ_ISSUE) has been replaced 









 All financial signals are calculated as in Piotroski's (2000) study except FS_FCFTA t , NEQISS t  and FS_ΔFCFTA t .
2
 All financial variables are calculated from annual financial statements.
Change in asset turnover
ΔTURN t = Total sales t  / (½Total assets t  + ½Total assets t-
1 ) - Total sales t-1  / (½Total assets t-1  + ½Total assets t-2 )
If FS_ΔTURN t  > 0, then 1, 
otherwise 0
FS_SCORE
FS_SCORE = FS_ROA + FS_FCFTA + FS_ACCRUAL + FS_ΔLEVER + FS_ΔLIQUID + 
NEQISS + FS_ΔROA + FS_ΔFCFTA + FS_ΔMARGIN + FS_ΔTURN
Net equity issuance NEQISS t = Equity repurchases t  - Equity issuance t
If NEQISS t  > 0, then 1, 
otherwise 0
Change in gross margin ΔMARGIN t = MARGIN t  - MARGIN t-1
If FS_ΔMARGIN t  > 0, 
then 1, otherwise 0
If FS_ΔFCFTA t  > 0, then 
1, otherwise 0
Change in return on assets ΔROA t = ROA t  - ROA t-1
If FS_ΔROA t  > 0, then 1, 
otherwise 0
Change in free cash flow ΔFCTA t = FCFTA t  - FCFTA t-1
Change in leverage
ΔLEVER t = [Total long-term debt t  / (½Total assets t  + 
½Total assets t-1 ) ] - [Total long-term debt t-1  / (½Total 
assets t-1  + ½Total assets t-2 )]
If FS_ΔLEVER t  < 0, then 
1, otherwise 0
Change in liquidty
ΔLIQUID t  = (Total current assets t  / Total current 
liabilities t ) - (Total current assets t-1  / Total current 
liabilities t-1 )
If FS_ΔLIQUID t  > 0, then 
1, otherwise 0
Accruals
ACCRUAL t  = (Net income before extraordinary items t  - 
Cash flow from operations t ) / Total assets t-1
If FS_ACCRUAL t  < 0, 
then 1, otherwise 0
Return on assets
ROA t = Net income before extraordinary items t  / Total 
assets t-1
If FS_ROA t  > 0, then 1, 
otherwise 0
Free cash flow
FCFTA t = (Net income before extra items/preferred 
dividends t  + Depreciation and amortization t  - Change in 
working capital t  - Capital expenditures t ) / Total assets t-1
If FS_FCFTA t  > 0, then 1, 
otherwise 0
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with net equity issuance variable (NEQISS), which is calculated as equity repurchases 
minus equity issuance. Gray and Carlisle (2013, 121) argue that the EQ_ISSUE variable 
used by Piotroski (2000) can be misleading as firms often issue shares for numerous rea-
sons that do not relate to financial distress including management and employee incentive 
programmes. Even though a firm issued equity, it could also make share buybacks at the 
same time that would potentially reverse the negative impact from equity issue. It follows 
that EQ_ISSUE variable in FSCORE would incorrectly penalize a firm. (Gray & Carlisle 
2013, 121.) We believe that this is a relevant issue in the US, where share buybacks are a 
very common way to distribute funds and signal information to shareholders.21 We cal-
culate NEQISS as the difference between common/preferred equity redeemed, retired and 
converted, and net proceeds from sale/issue of common/preferred equity. Thus, if equity 
redeemed, retired and converted exceeds net proceeds from sale/issue of equity, NEQISS 
is defined as one and otherwise zero. 
The last category in the FS_SCORE, recent operational improvements, is rather similar 
to operational efficiency category in the FSCORE. However, the focus is slightly more 
on analysing the trend in fundamentals as it includes change in return on assets (∆ROA) 
and change in free cash flow (∆FCFTA) in addition to change in gross margin (∆MAR-
GIN) and change in asset turnover (∆TURN). ∆ROA is the same variable as in the 
FSCORE, but it has been transferred from profitability category to recent operational im-
provements category in the FS_SCORE. ∆FCFTA measures change in free cash flow and 
is calculated as the current fiscal year’s FCFTA less prior fiscal year’s FCFTA. Thus, if 
∆FCFTA is positive, it is defined as one and otherwise zero. 
Finally, the aggregate FS_SCORE for each stock 𝑖 is calculated in a similar manner to 
FSCORE and the formula can be written as follows: 
   
 𝐹𝑆_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐹𝑆_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐹𝑆_∆𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_∆𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑁𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐹𝑆_∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_∆𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_∆𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐹𝑆_∆𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 
(5) 
   
As there are ten binary signals, the aggregate FS_SCORE ranges between zero and ten 
compared to from zero to nine in FSCORE. Hence, the aggregate FS_SCORE measures 
fundamental strength similar fashion to FSCORE, but with some important modifications 
to avoid buying stocks that are likely to continue to underperform (“value trap”). 
                                                 
21 According to Grullon and Michaely (2002, 1649), expenditures on share repurchase programmes relative 
to total earnings have increased from less than 5% in 1980 to almost 42% in 2000 in the US. Expenditures 
on share repurchases have grown significantly faster than dividends since 1980s and were higher than div-
idend payments in 1999–2000 (Grullon & Michaely 2002, 1649).  
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3.2.3 Portfolio formation and hypotheses 
The main purpose of this thesis is to study whether one-year ahead buy-and-hold returns 
for value and momentum strategies can be enhanced using fundamentals based on 
FS_SCORE. Each year at the end of June between 1997 and 2014 we sort out value and 
momentum stocks listed in the S&P Composite 1500 index with all required data to form 
fundamental value and momentum portfolios. There are total of 18 one-year buy-and-
hold periods in our sample period. The investment process and hypotheses go as follows.  
Firstly, in each holding period the book-to-market ratio and past 12-month momentum 
are computed for each stock and then ranked. All stocks above the 70th percentile based 
on the prior calendar year-end book-to-market ratio and the past 12-month momentum 
are classified as value and momentum stocks. Hence, the final sample retains only the 
stocks in the over 70th percentile B/M and MOM-12 rank. From the total sample of 18,747 
firm-year observations, we obtain 5,639 and 5,627 firm-year observations classified as 
value and momentum stocks. Secondly, FS_SCORE is calculated for each value and mo-
mentum stock using the fiscal year-end data. Gray and Carlisle (2013) only compare long-
only strategies for stocks with an FS_SCORE greater than or equal to seven against stocks 
with an FSCORE greater than or equal to six. In comparison, Piotroski (2000) classifies 
stocks with FSCORE greater than or equal to eight as fundamentally strong and stocks 
with FSCORE equal to or less than one as fundamentally weak. Piotroski (2000) then 
compares high FSCORE stocks against both low FSCORE stocks and all value stocks. As 
we want to test whether FS_SCORE can be used to enhance value and momentum port-
folios, we will follow a similar method as Piotroski (2000). Hence, each year we classify 
stocks with an aggregate FS_SCORE greater than or equal to six as high FS_SCORE 
stocks and stocks with an aggregate FS_SCORE equal to or less than four as low 
FS_SCORE stocks. This scoring system ensures that there are enough observations both 
in high and low FS_SCORE portfolios. 
At the final stage, the performance of fundamental value and momentum strategies are 
examined. Each year at the beginning of July in year 𝑡 we form equally-weighted funda-
mental value and momentum portfolios. We hold these portfolios for the following 12 
months and rebalance them annually at the end of each June in year 𝑡 + 1. Thus, the initial 
equal-weight for each stock changes during the 12-month buy-and-hold period as we do 
not rebalance monthly to maintain equal weights. The reason why we use this weighting 
approach is that our sample contains a significant proportion of smaller stocks and thus 
we want to avoid a heavy tilt towards large market capitalization stocks. Further, although 
it might be possible to achieve higher returns with more frequent rebalancing (particularly 
for momentum strategy) and with different weighting schemes, this would in all proba-
bility increase practical trading costs significantly. It is important to note that Piotroski 
(2000) also uses the 12-month buy-and hold period, but calculates the return for each 
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stock starting from the beginning of the fifth month after each firm’s individual fiscal 
year-end. Thus, unlike Piotroski (2000), we compute the buy-and-hold monthly returns 
from July of year 𝑡 to June of year 𝑡 + 1 for each stock irrespective of the fiscal year-end. 
As Duong et al. (2014, 532) point out, this can be problematic as there is a long gap 
between the fiscal year-ends in year 𝑡 − 1 and portfolio formation date at the beginning 
of July in year 𝑡. This is particularly true for stocks with a fiscal-year end before Decem-
ber in year 𝑡 − 1. However, as we want to test fundamentals-based strategies using both 
mean returns calculated from the pooled firm-year observations like Piotroski (2000) and 
as a more practical portfolio strategy like Duong et al. (2014), we use the same portfolio 
formation date for all stocks each year. The complete investment process is summarized 
in figure 2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2 Portfolio formation and investment process 
Like Piotroski (2000) and Chen et al. (2016), we expect portfolios with value and mo-
mentum stocks that have strong fundamentals to outperform against (1) portfolios with 
value and momentum stocks that have weak fundamentals and (2) all value and momen-
tum stocks. Specifically, we have the following four hypotheses: 
   
H1: Value stocks with high FS_SCORE outperform value stocks with low 
FS_SCORE. 
   
H2: Value stocks with high FS_SCORE outperform all value stocks. 
   







Year t Year t+1Year t-1
Compute FS_SCORE  for each 
firm at the fiscal year-end
Stocks above the 70th 
percentile B/M  ratio and 
MOM-12  rank are classified 
as value and momentum stocks
Compute MOM-12  for each firm as 
the the cumulative total return of the 
previous 12 months (skipping the 
most recent month)
Compute B/M  ratio for each 
firm at the end of last quarter 
at the calendar year-end
3. Portfolio rebalancing2. Portfolio formation1. Calendar year-end
12-month buy-and-hold period
Form equally-weighted 
fundamental value and 
momentum portfolios at the 
beginning of July 
Rebalance portfolios annually at 
the end of June
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H4: Momentum stocks with high FS_SCORE outperform all momentum stocks. 
  
To test these hypotheses, we use two parametric tests. Firstly, like Piotroski (2000), we 
use the two-sample t-test to investigate whether high FS_SCORE minus low FS_SCORE 
(high-low) and high FS_SCORE minus all value/momentum stocks (high-all) mean raw 
and market-adjusted one-year buy-and-hold returns calculated from the pooled firm-year 
observations are significantly different from zero. Secondly, like Duong et al. (2014), we 
apply the one-sample t-test in the portfolio analysis to see whether monthly portfolios’ 
returns are statistically different from zero. It is also important to mention that both Pi-
otroski (2000, 11) and Duong et al. (2014, 534) note that traditional parametric tests are 
problematic when using long-run buy-and-hold returns and complement parametric tests 
with the bootstrapping method. We do not, however, implement bootstrapping method in 
this thesis, but we recognize that our parametric tests for long-run buy-and-hold returns 
are likely to suffer from statistical biases. 
3.3 Portfolio performance measurement 
Following portfolio formation, the next step is to evaluate portfolios performance. We 
use gross total returns to calculate portfolios’ performance and thus we do not take trading 
costs into account. One of the simplest ways to measure abnormal returns for portfolios 
is to compute market-adjusted returns using a benchmark portfolio. Like Piotroski (2000), 
we use a value-weighted market index as a benchmark portfolio. To compute market-
adjusted returns, we use firm-specific and S&P 1500 monthly total return indices to com-
pute one-year market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns. The S&P Composite 1500 index is 
a float-adjusted and market capitalization weighted index that is rebalanced quarterly 
(S&P Composite 1500 Month-End Factsheet 2016). Thus, the one-year market-adjusted 
buy-and-hold return 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑇 for firm 𝑖 can be written as: 
   
 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝐴𝑊𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑀𝑘𝑡,𝑡 (6) 
   
where 𝑅𝐴𝑊𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is the raw total return for firm 𝑖 and 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑀𝑘𝑡,𝑡 is the raw total 
market return for S&P 1500. 
Using one-year market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns to measure abnormal perfor-
mance can, however, be problematic. Although Barber and Lyon (1997, 342) argue that 
calculating long-run abnormal returns as simply the buy-and-hold return on sample firm 
less the buy-and-hold return on a benchmark portfolio/index is more robust than using 
cumulative abnormal returns, this method also has its problems.  Specifically, it suffers 
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from new listing, rebalancing and positive long-run return skewness biases. Furthermore, 
it does not take firm-specific risk characteristics into account. This results in test statistics 
where the null hypothesis for mean abnormal returns is rejected more often than the the-
oretical rejection rate would suggest i.e. negative bias. (Barber & Lyon 1997, 342.) To 
correct these misspecifications, Barber and Lyon (1997, 342) argue that abnormal returns 
on a sample firm should be calculated using the control-firm approach based on similar 
size and B/M ratio cut-offs. Although we only calculate market-adjusted abnormal returns 
for individual sample firms, we also apply more sophisticated risk-adjusted performance 
measurement methods when calculating portfolio performance for fundamental value and 
momentum strategies. 
The first more intuitive risk-adjusted performance measure that we use is the tradi-
tional Sharpe ratio (SR), which can be written as: 





   
where 𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓 is the mean equity risk premium for the portfolio 𝑝 and 𝜎𝑝 is the standard 
deviation i.e. total risk of the portfolio. Hence, the Sharpe ratio (also known as the reward-
to-variability ratio) measures the risk-adjusted compensation – the higher the slope the 
better the risk-adjusted performance. To calculate the ex-post Sharpe ratio for portfolios, 
we use realised return and standard deviation and one-month Treasury bill rate down-
loaded from Kenneth R. French website as a proxy for risk-free rate. One could, however, 
criticize the Sharpe ratio as it uses a measure for the total risk instead of the systematic 
risk, it suffers if the stock returns are not normally distributed and it does not allow for a 
clear comparison of the economic significance of portfolios performance. Further, the 
Sharpe ratio is an unstable and biased measure for portfolio performance during economic 
downturns, when the average excess returns (𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑓) are clearly negative (Grable & 
Chatterjee 2008, 13). 
To obtain a more practical view of the risk-adjusted performance, we also measure 
whether portfolios generate risk-adjusted abnormal returns with the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM), the Fama and French three-factor model (FF3) and the Carhart four-
factor model (Carhart). The CAPM argues that the cross-sectional variation in excess 
stock returns is explained by the market risk (beta). Hence, the CAPM is a single risk 
factor model and can be written as the following time-series regression: 
   
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑝𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡, (8) 
   
where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 is the excess return of the portfolio in year 𝑡, 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑝 is the portfolio’s 
market beta, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑝 is the excess return of the market portfolio and 𝜀𝑝,𝑡 is the residual. 
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There has, however, been a lot of criticism towards the CAPM and various studies have 
documented that the market risk does not explain the cross-sectional variation in stock 
returns. This motivates us to use also the FF3 and the Carhart models, which seek to 
explain returns with three and four risk factors: Market factor (MKT), size factor (SMB), 
value factor (HML) and momentum factor (WML). Hence, besides the MKT factor, the 
SMB, the HML and the WML factors measure the additional risk exposure to investing in 
smaller, high B/M and high momentum stocks. The key reason why we also use the Car-
hart model besides the most commonly used three-factor model is due to the evidence 
that the three-factor model explains weakly the cross-sectional variation in momentum 
portfolios (Carhart 1997, 61). 
To measure whether the portfolio generates an excess return over these risk factors, 
we can now write the three-factor and the Carhart model as the following time-series 
regressions: 
   
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑝𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡, (9) 
   
   
 𝑟𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 =  𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑝𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝛽𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑝𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡, 
(10) 
   
where 𝑟𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 is the excess return of the portfolio in year 𝑡 and 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 and 
𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡 are the returns for the market, size, value and momentum risk factor mimicking 
portfolios.22 The betas 𝛽𝑀𝐾𝑇,𝑝, 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑝, 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑝 and 𝛽𝑊𝑀𝐿,𝑝 represent the sensitivity of the 
portfolio to the market, size, value and momentum risk factors. Thus, the key purpose is 
to regress the excess returns of the fundamental portfolios on the excess returns of the 
risk factor mimicking portfolios to measure whether fundamental portfolios generate risk-
adjusted abnormal returns i.e. alpha 𝛼𝑖. If the estimated 𝛼𝑖 is statistically different from 
zero, it means that the excess returns of the portfolios are not explained by the portfolios 
sensitivity to the above-mentioned risk factors. A statistically significant and positive al-
pha would thus indicate abnormal returns over the systematic risk factors. However, it is 
worthy to remember that the CAPM, the FF3 and the Carhart model are just proxies for 
the total systematic risk and it is possible that there are other risk factors not captured by 
the models. To measure the CAPM, the FF3 and the Carhart alphas, we use the monthly 
factors for US stocks provided at the Kenneth R. French’s website. We also control the 
potential autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity problems by using Newey-West (1987) 
correction for standard errors when calculating t-values. 
                                                 
22 SMB is the difference between the returns for small and large market capitalization stocks, HML is the 
difference between the returns for high book-to-market and low book-to-market stocks and WML is the 
difference between the returns for past winners and losers. 
55 
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
We provide three kinds of descriptive statistics. Firstly, we calculate descriptive statistics 
for the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, S&P SmallCap 600 and S&P Composite 1500 indices 
using daily raw total returns. As our sample includes high B/M and MOM-12 stocks from 
the above-mentioned indices, we believe that daily index-level data provides a good over-
view of the US market during the sample period. We have used daily raw returns when 
calculating index-level descriptive statistics due to higher statistical significance, but all 
other return calculations are based on monthly raw returns. Secondly, we provide a sum-
mary of the financial characteristics of all high B/M and MOM-12 stocks. Thirdly, the 
Spearman correlation analysis is used to study the relation between the one-year buy-and-
hold raw and market-adjusted returns and the fundamental signals.  
Starting from the index-level data in table 4, the annualized cumulative return has been 
positive across all indices from the beginning of July 1997 to the end of June 2015. The 
S&P 400 has produced the highest annual cumulative return and Sharpe ratio of 10.7% 
and 0.498 respectively. The S&P 500 has been the worst performer by a wide margin, 
which can be seen as the lowest cumulative return. The higher returns for the S&P 400 
and S&P 600 indices could indicate the existence of small cap premium, but it is good to 
note that the S&P 600 has underperformed against the S&P 400. When analysing the 
degree of symmetry in returns, we can see that index returns have been negatively 
skewed. This means that the return distributions for the indices have had frequent small 
gains and few extreme losses. Hence, the return distributions have a longer tail on the left 
side. Further, the return distributions for the indices are clearly more peaked i.e. leptokur-
tic than normal distribution when looking at kurtosis. For all indices, the kurtosis is clearly 
over three, meaning that the return distributions for the indices have fatter tails than in 
normal distribution. Thus, the return distributions do not seem to be normally distributed, 
which is also confirmed by Jarque-Bera test as the null hypothesis of a normal distribution 
is rejected at a 1% significance level for all indices.23 Overall, our results for the return 
distributions seem to be in line with previous research as negative skewness and excess 
kurtosis have been reported to be common characteristic for stock returns. 
Table 5 provides the financial characteristics of high B/M and MOM-12 stocks. The 
mean (median) end of June market capitalization of high B/M stocks is 3,509 (931) mil-
lion dollars, which is considerably less than 9,638 (2,253) million dollars for high MOM-
12 stocks. The mean market capitalization is significantly larger than the median both for 
                                                 
23 Results are also similar when using daily continuously compounded returns (not reported in table 4). 
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high B/M and MOM-12 stocks, indicating that the S&P 500 stocks represent a large por-
tion of the total market capitalization. This characteristic is similar to the results reported 
by Piotroski (2000) and Duong et al. (2014), which motivates us to use equally-weighted 
approach when constructing portfolios. Otherwise portfolio weights would be heavily 
tilted towards large market capitalization stocks. However, as S&P 400 and S&P 600 
stocks are likely to contain the majority of the sample portfolios, there could be practical 
liquidity and trading cost constraints when implementing the strategies.  
Table 4 Descriptive statistics for the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, S&P SmallCap 




Figure 3 Performance of the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, S&P SmallCap 600 and 
S&P Composite 1500 indices 
The average B/M ratio and MOM-12 are 0.822 and 0.091 for value stocks, whereas 
corresponding figures are 0.425 and 0.569 for momentum stocks. Thus, value stocks tend 
S&P 500 0.065 0.197 -0.032 11.120 0.000 0.331 4 696
S&P 400 0.107 0.215 -0.204 9.290 0.000 0.498 4 696
S&P 600 0.094 0.226 -0.144 7.658 0.000 0.417 4 696








Stdev (%) Skewness Kurtosis
This table reports descriptive statistics for S&P 500, S&P 400, S&P 600 and S&P 1500 indices from the 
beginning of July 1997 to the end of June 2015. We have used daily raw total returns. Thus, there are total of 
4,696 daily observations for each index. Cumulative return, standard deviation and Sharpe ratio have been 
annualized assuming 252 trading days. When calculating the Sharpe ratio, we have used annualized cumulative 
return instead of mean return, and we have also excluded the risk-free rate when calculating the excess return. 
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to be on average smaller, trade on lower valuation relative to book value, and have poor 
historical stock returns compared to momentum stocks. When looking at the fundamen-
tals, we can see why. Value stocks have on average distinctly lower current profitability 
and weaker year-on-year trend in fundamentals compared to momentum stocks. This is 
true for each profitability and operational improvement signal. For example, value stocks 
average ROA, FCFTA, ∆ROA, ∆FCTA and ∆GM are 0.029, 0.004, -0.013, 0.007 and -
0.004 respectively, whereas the corresponding figures for momentum stocks are 0.075, 
0.022, 0.007, 0.012 and 0.002. It is also interesting to note that ΔLEVER and ΔLIQUID 
are very close for value and momentum stocks. The fact that ΔLIQUID is negative for 
momentum stocks could potentially be explained by the supposedly higher growth, which 
increases need for working capital. Overall, the results for value stocks are fairly similar 
to Fama and French (1995), Chen and Zhang (1998) and Piotroski (2000) as value stocks’ 
ex ante fundamental strength appears to be relatively weak. Hence, many high B/M stocks 
could be financially distressed and thus bear higher risk, whereas high MOM-12 stocks 
show on average better fundamental signals.   
Table 5 Financial characteristics of high B/M and MOM-12 stocks 
 
Panel A: High B/M firms
MVE
1
3 509 931 11 298 n.a
B/M 0.822 0.735 0.354 n.a
MOM-12
2
0.091 0.058 0.414 n.a
FS_SCORE 5.651 6.000 1.805 n.a
ROA 0.029 0.038 0.141 0.804
FCFTA 0.004 0.015 0.163 0.591
ACCRUAL -0.059 -0.052 0.127 0.849
ΔLEVER 0.000 -0.003 0.092 0.608
ΔLIQUID -0.038 0.003 1.069 0.503
ΔROA -0.013 -0.004 0.153 0.440
ΔFCFTA 0.007 0.002 0.206 0.514
ΔMARGIN -0.004 -0.002 0.082 0.447
ΔTURN -0.036 -0.012 0.275 0.453
This table reports the financial characteristics of all high B/M  and high MOM-12  firms across the 
sample period between 1997 and 2015. There are total of 5,639 and 5,627 firm-year observations 
respectively. Using all sample firms, we have calculated mean, median and standard deviation for each 
FS_SCORE  signal, market value, B/M  ratio and MOM-12 . In addition, we report the proportion of 








When testing the hypotheses, we classify stocks with a composite score greater than 
or equal to six as high FS_SCORE stocks and stocks with a score less than or equal to 
four as low FS_SCORE stocks. The weaker fundamentals for high B/M stocks can be seen 
in table 6 as lower (higher) share of high B/M stocks belongs to high (low) FS_SCORE 
group compared to high MOM-12 stocks. In general, most observations are clustered be-
tween score 3 and 7 portfolios as there fewer observations in the extreme portfolios. Ad-
ditionally, similar to Piotroski (2000) and Aspris et al. (2013), there is a significant dif-
ference between the amount of observations in the high and low FS_SCORE portfolios. 
There are total of 3,026 (53.7%) and 3,696 (65.7%) observations classified as high 
FS_SCORE firms in value and momentum portfolios, compared to 1,527 (27.1%) and 
1,028 (18.3%) observations classified as low FS_SCORE firms. However, the amount of 
observations in the extreme portfolios seems to be large enough to test the ability of fun-
damental analysis in order to separate winners from losers. 
Variable
Panel B: High MOM-12 firms
MVE
1
9 638 2 253 29 713 n.a
B/M 0.425 0.366 0.297 n.a
MOM-12
2
0.569 0.476 0.452 n.a
FS_SCORE 6.180 6.000 1.789 n.a
ROA 0.075 0.070 0.109 0.884
FCFTA 0.022 0.030 0.160 0.650
ACCRUAL -0.066 -0.059 0.095 0.863
ΔLEVER -0.003 -0.003 0.101 0.660
ΔLIQUID -0.039 0.001 1.008 0.501
ΔROA 0.007 0.005 0.105 0.573
ΔFCFTA 0.012 0.007 0.229 0.530
ΔMARGIN 0.002 0.003 0.201 0.557
ΔTURN -0.013 -0.001 0.212 0.497
1
 Market value of equity at the end of June in year t.
2
 Previous 12-month cumulative total return (skipping the most recent month) computed at the end of 







Table 6 Distribution of FS_SCORE values across high B/M and MOM-12 stocks 
 
The Spearman correlations and level of significances between one-year raw and mar-
ket-adjusted buy-and-hold returns, the ten fundamental signals and the composite 
FS_SCORE are presented in table 7. Like Piotroski (2000), we focus on analysing the 
relation between the fundamentals and market-adjusted returns (MARET). The results are 
not consistent with the expectations as the composite FS_SCORE does not have a statis-
tically significant correlation with one-year ahead MARET. For high B/M stocks, the cor-
relation between FS_SCORE and MARET is only 0.020 and clearly statistically insignif-
icant with confidence level of 0.05. For high MOM-12 stocks the corresponding results 





























This table reports the distribution of the aggregate FS_SCORE  values of all high B/M 
and high MOM-12  firms across the sample period between 1997 and 2015. There are 
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are similar as the correlation is only 0.023 and also statistically insignificant. In compar-
ison, Piotroski (2000) reported a statistically significant correlation of 0.121 between 
FSCORE and one-year ahead MARET for high B/M stocks. Chen et al. (2016) also re-
ported a positive correlation between FSCORE, past 12-month buy-and hold returns and 
future returns, but future returns were measured using 1- and 3-month periods. One could 
argue that this reflects the weakness of FS_SCORE relative to FSCORE, but we believe 
this to be unlikely. Only two of the original variables, OCF and EQ_ISSUE, have been 
changed, and ∆FCFTA is the only additional variable in FS_SCORE. As FCFTA and 
NEQISS are very close substitutes to OCF and EQ_ISSUE, we find it difficult to believe 
that FS_SCORE would not capture the same return characteristics as the original 
FSCORE. When looking at the individual fundamental variables, the results are also in-
triguing. For high B/M stocks, only ∆TURN variable has a statistically significant positive 
correlation with one-year ahead MARET. For high MOM-12 stocks, FCFTA, ∆LIQUID 
and NEQISS variables have a statistically significant and positive relation with MARET, 
giving slightly more support for using fundamentals among momentum stocks.  
Table 7 Spearman correlation analysis between the one-year buy-and-hold re-
turns, the individual fundamental signals and the composite FS_SCORE 
 
Variable ROA FCFTA ACCRUAL ΔLEVER ΔLIQUID NEQISS ΔROA ΔFCFTA ΔMARGIN ΔTURN FS_SCORE
Panel A: High B/M firms
RAWRET -0.036 -0.008 0.033 0.005 0.007 -0.010 0.010 -0.008 0.000 0.019 0.002
0.007 0.560 0.013 0.716 0.599 0.464 0.473 0.526 0.978 0.152 0.877
MARET -0.005 0.007 0.021 -0.002 0.001 0.025 0.010 -0.001 -0.008 0.030 0.020
0.695 0.603 0.111 0.898 0.944 0.065 0.437 0.958 0.561 0.024 0.134
ROA 1.000 0.230 -0.131 0.070 0.047 0.102 0.243 0.085 0.130 0.022 0.436
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.097 0.000
FCFTA ── 1.000 0.038 0.161 -0.332 0.170 0.079 0.415 0.017 0.074 0.488
0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.214 0.000 0.000
ACCRUAL ── ── 1.000 0.060 -0.059 0.050 -0.102 0.003 -0.041 0.015 0.159
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.840 0.002 0.252 0.000
ΔLEVER ── ── ── 1.000 0.070 -0.047 0.057 0.118 0.044 0.074 0.425
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
ΔLIQUID ── ── ── ── 1.000 -0.036 0.035 -0.326 0.030 -0.041 0.093
0.007 0.008 0.000 0.024 0.002 0.000
NEQISS ── ── ── ── ── 1.000 -0.068 0.028 -0.035 -0.022 0.291
0.000 0.035 0.008 0.098 0.000
ΔROA ── ── ── ── ── ── 1.000 0.109 0.362 0.299 0.554
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ΔFCFTA ── ── ── ── ── ── ── 1.000 0.055 0.020 0.406
0.000 0.129 0.000
ΔMARGIN ── ── ── ── ── ── ── ── 1.000 0.103 0.453
0.000 0.000
ΔTURN ── ── ── ── ── ── ── ── ── 1.000 0.423
0.000
FS_SCORE ── ── ── ── ── ── ── ── ── ── 1.000
Panel A shows Spearman correlation analysis between raw (RAWRET ) and market-adjusted (MARET ) 12-month buy-and-hold returns, the ten fundamental 
FS_SCORE  signals and the composite FS_SCORE  for high B/M firms. The level of significances (2-tailed) are presented below the correlations. Individual 
fundamental signals equal one (zero) if the signal was good (bad) about the future performance. RAWRET  is calculated for each stock as the 12-month buy-
and-hold return commencing at the beginning of July in each calendar year t . MARET  is calculated for each stock as the 12-month buy-and-hold return 
commencing at the beginning of July in each calendar year t  less the corresponding return of S&P 1500 index over the respective holding period. All binary 
fundamental signals are calculated as defined in Appendix 1. The sample includes 5,639 firm-year observations in holding periods between 1997 and 2015.
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Overall, the results from Spearman correlation analysis are problematic when consid-
ering our hypotheses. The statistically insignificant correlation between FS_SCORE and 
future returns could potentially reflect biases in our data, sample period specific issues or 
too long a gap between the fiscal year-ends in year 𝑡 − 1 and portfolio formation date at 
the beginning of July in year 𝑡. However, it is also possible that abnormal returns have 
been arbitraged away as our sample period is 1997–2015 compared to 1976–1996 by 
Piotroski (2000), or that our results reflect an average mean-reversion in ex post funda-
mentals. Thus, we continue with our original fundamental value and momentum strate-
gies and hypotheses as we believe that this will still provide valuable information. 
4.2 Performance of fundamental strategies 
4.2.1 Returns for all high book-to-market and momentum stocks 
As our empirical tests for fundamental value and momentum strategies rely on the exist-
ence of positive market-adjusted returns for value and momentum stocks, we need to first 
confirm this. Table 8 presents the one-year buy-and-hold returns for long-only value and 
momentum portfolios that have been calculated from the pooled firm-year observations 
Variable ROA FCFTA ACCRUAL ΔLEVER ΔLIQUID NEQISS ΔROA ΔFCFTA ΔMARGIN ΔTURN FS_SCORE
Panel B: High MOM-12 firms
RAWRET -0.009 0.036 0.021 0.001 0.038 0.030 -0.011 -0.022 -0.013 -0.018 0.015
0.487 0.006 0.113 0.942 0.004 0.025 0.425 0.103 0.331 0.173 0.276
MARET 0.017 0.047 0.010 0.000 0.040 0.052 -0.012 -0.017 -0.021 -0.017 0.023
0.190 0.000 0.453 0.986 0.003 0.000 0.374 0.192 0.108 0.211 0.087
ROA 1.000 0.206 -0.078 0.085 0.076 0.132 0.247 0.049 0.145 0.029 0.394
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.000
FCFTA ── 1.000 0.055 0.100 -0.296 0.266 0.056 0.374 0.018 0.073 0.467
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.000
ACCRUAL ── ── 1.000 0.066 -0.052 0.041 -0.079 0.005 -0.004 0.011 0.192
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.698 0.788 0.415 0.000
ΔLEVER ── ── ── 1.000 0.079 -0.062 0.065 0.101 0.077 0.060 0.398
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ΔLIQUID ── ── ── ── 1.000 -0.024 0.058 -0.352 0.046 -0.055 0.120
0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NEQISS ── ── ── ── ── 1.000 -0.027 0.055 -0.025 0.023 0.359
0.042 0.000 0.065 0.080 0.000
ΔROA ── ── ── ── ── ── 1.000 0.081 0.351 0.317 0.561
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ΔFCFTA ── ── ── ── ── ── ── 1.000 0.057 0.036 0.376
0.000 0.007 0.000
ΔMARGIN ── ── ── ── ── ── ── ── 1.000 0.086 0.468
0.000 0.000
ΔTURN ── ── ── ── ── ── ── ── ── 1.000 0.443
0.000
FS_SCORE ── ── ── ── ── ── ── ── ── ── 1.000
Panel B shows Spearman correlation analysis between raw (RAWRET ) and market-adjusted (MARET ) 12-month buy-and-hold returns, the ten fundamental 
FS_SCORE  signals and the composite FS_SCORE  for high MOM-12 firms. The sample includes 5,627 firm-year observations in holding periods between 
1997 and 2015. All other information is as presented in Panel A.
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between July 1999 and June 2015. To test the statistical significance of returns, we use 
the one-sample t-test for market-adjusted returns, where the null hypothesis is defined as 
zero and the confidence level is set at 0.05. Additionally, table 8 shows the proportion of 
high B/M and MOM-12 stocks with positive raw and market-adjusted buy-and-hold re-
turns over the one-year buy-and-hold period. 
The mean one-year raw buy-and-hold return has been 13.3% for all high B/M stocks. 
Consistent with Piotroski (2000), the mean one-year market-adjusted buy-and-hold return 
is also clearly positive and economically significant at 5.0% with p-value less than 0.000. 
Therefore, value stocks have outperformed the market during the sample period. It is also 
important to note that 59.9% (48.8%) of all high B/M stocks earn positive raw (market-
adjusted) one-year buy-and-hold returns. The return distribution for value stocks is thus 
skewed to the left as reported by Piotroski (2000), although not as much as only 43.7% 
of value stocks earned positive one-year ahead market-adjusted returns in his study. The 
fact that over 50% of all high B/M stocks earn negative one-year ahead market-adjusted 
returns indicates that the returns earned by value strategy could be improved by separating 
winners from losers using fundamental analysis.  
The high MOM-12 stocks have produced a mean one-year raw buy-and-hold return of 
11.6%. The mean market-adjusted return of 3.3% is also statistically and economically 
significant with p-value of 0.000. Although high MOM-12 stocks have also outperformed 
the market, the mean market-adjusted return is clearly lower than for high B/M stocks. 
This is likely to be partially due to the 12-month holding and rebalancing frequency, low-
ering momentum returns as momentum strategies have been shown to perform better with 
higher rebalancing frequency (i.e. turnover) and shorter holding periods. However, as we 
want to combine annual fundamentals with momentum and to make the strategy more 
comparable to the fundamental value strategy, we believe that it is convenient to form 
portfolios annually. Interestingly, the proportion of high MOM-12 stocks with positive 
one-year ahead returns is also very close to the high B/M stocks. Out of all high MOM-
12 stocks, 59.2% (48.0%) earn positive raw (market-adjusted) returns. Thus, the conclu-
sion is rather similar as with value stocks as the return distribution is skewed to the left. 
Overall, the evidence suggest that value and momentum stocks have produced positive 
market-adjusted returns, but the returns could potentially be further improved using fun-
damentals to separate winners from losers. 
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Table 8 One-year buy-and-hold returns for all high B/M and high MOM-12 stocks 
 
4.2.2 Returns for fundamental value and momentum strategies 
Tables 9 and 10 present raw and market-adjusted one-year buy-and-hold returns for fun-
damental value and momentum strategies. Similar with Piotroski (2000), we calculate the 
returns as equally-weighted average from the pooled firm-year observations for each 
composite FS_SCORE portfolio. To be consistent, our analysis focuses on the one-year 
market-adjusted returns, which are reported at panel B in tables 9 and 10. 
We start by looking at the results for fundamental value strategy in table 9. Whereas 
Piotroski (2000) finds a stable and positive relationship between FSCORE and one-year 
market-adjusted returns in high B/M portfolio, we find no support for fundamental value 
strategy as low FS_SCORE stocks outperform high FS_SCORE stocks; the mean one-
year market-adjusted return is 6.2% for low FS_SCORE stocks compared to 4.7% for 
high FS_SCORE stocks. The mean high-low return difference of -1.5% is not, however, 
statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level using the parametric two-sample t-
test. High FS_SCORE stocks also underperform against the complete portfolio of high 
B/M firms; the mean high-all return difference is -0.3%, but also clearly statistically in-
significant. These return differences are mainly driven by stocks with FS_SCORE be-
tween 1 and 3 as these stocks produce mean market-adjusted return of 14.7%, 6.7% and 
6.9% respectively. Also, stocks with FS_SCORE of 10 produce only a mean market-ad-
justed return of 3.0%. 
Panel A: High B/M stocks
Raw 0.133 -0.373 -0.155 0.087 0.354 0.666 0.599
Market-adjusted 0.050 -0.425 -0.224 -0.010 0.259 0.563 0.488
t-statistics 8.396 ── ── ── ── ── ──
p-value (α = 0.05) 0.000 ── ── ── ── ── ──
Panel B: High MOM-12 stocks
Raw 0.116 -0.375 -0.165 0.073 0.324 0.614 0.592
Market-adjusted 0.033 -0.410 -0.221 -0.017 0.217 0.494 0.480
t-statistics 5.781 ── ── ── ── ── ──







This table reports 12-month raw and market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns for all high B/M  and MOM-12  stocks. There is a total 
of 5,639 and 5,627 firm-year observations for high B/M  and MOM-12  stocks between 1997 and 2015.  Raw return is calculated for 
each stock as the 12-month buy-and-hold return commencing at the beginning of July in each calendar year t . Market-adjusted 
return is calculated for each stock as the 12-month buy-and-hold return commencing at the beginning of July in each calendar year 
t  less the corresponding return of S&P 1500 index over the respective holding period. We also report a one-sample t -statistics and 
p -values for 12-month market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns using a 0.05 confidence level, where the null hypothesis (H0 ) for 








The fact that low FS_SCORE stocks outperform high FS_SCORE stocks is likely to 
reflect both return bias and mean-reversion in fundamentals. Firstly, as we assume a 
delisting return of zero, the performance-related delisting returns are likely to be biased 
upwards. Secondly, if investors have extrapolated weak fundamentals too far into the fu-
ture, the mean-reversion in fundamentals for previously distressed firms is likely to pro-
duce exceptional returns. Hence, it is also possible that value investors overreact to bad 
financial information as suggested by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), which 
causes more significant under-pricing of value stocks with low FS_SCORE. Also, it could 
reflect the confirmation bias if value investors underreact to good fundamental infor-
mation for low FS_SCORE stocks as it contradicts with their previous view. Although 
Duong et al. (2014) find support for the confirmation bias hypothesis among value stocks 
using FSCORE, our suggestions are incongruent with their results. According to Duong 
et al. (2014, 543–544), the fundamental value strategy produces abnormal returns by go-
ing long for high FSCORE stocks as value investors underreact to good fundamental in-
formation, but our results seem to reflect the opposite. Overall, we can reject our first two 
hypotheses that (H1) value stocks with high FS_SCORE outperform value stocks with 
low FS_SCORE and (H2) value stocks with high FS_SCORE outperform all value stocks. 
The rejection of the first two hypotheses is in line with the recent evidence by Hanson 
and Dhanuka (2015), who found that various fundamental strategies including FSCORE 
did not generate abnormal returns in the US between 2000 and 2013. 
When looking at the relation between FS_SCORE and return distribution of high B/M 
stocks, some interesting results emerge. The fundamental value strategy seems to shift 
the return distribution to the right only when looking at the lower percentiles as the 10th 
percentile, 25th percentile and median returns of the high FS_SCORE portfolio are higher 
than the corresponding returns of both the low FS_SCORE and the complete high B/M 
portfolio. However, similar with Piotroski (2000), our results show that the proportion of 
winners in the high FS_SCORE portfolio (49.3%) is higher than in the low FS_SCORE 
portfolio (48.8%) or the complete high B/M portfolio (48.8%), although the shift is very 
modest compared to Piotroski’s (2000) results. When looking at the 75th and 90th per-
centile returns, the low FS_SCORE stocks produce excessive returns compared to the 
high FS_SCORE stocks and the complete high B/M portfolio. As our sample period in-
cludes two financial market crises, namely the tech bubble and the financial crisis during 
1999–2001 and 2007–2009, it could be that this is explained by the superior returns of 
distressed turnaround value stocks. Thus, overall, the fundamental value strategy does not 
seem to shift the return distribution in a way that is economically meaningful. 
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Table 9 One-year buy-and-hold returns to fundamental value strategy 
 
Panel A: Raw returns
1
All firms 0.133 -0.373 -0.155 0.087 0.354 0.666 0.599 5 639
FS_SCORE
0 0.011 -0.256 -0.256 0.011 ── ── 0.500 2
1 0.239 -0.470 -0.268 -0.001 0.495 1.480 0.487 39
2 0.182 -0.458 -0.179 0.056 0.524 0.863 0.564 188
3 0.161 -0.468 -0.179 0.100 0.422 0.795 0.586 456
4 0.148 -0.402 -0.161 0.105 0.385 0.712 0.605 842
5 0.123 -0.397 -0.160 0.071 0.343 0.678 0.585 1 086
6 0.118 -0.369 -0.180 0.061 0.330 0.644 0.572 1 162
7 0.128 -0.335 -0.123 0.103 0.352 0.592 0.634 952
8 0.121 -0.327 -0.129 0.084 0.324 0.615 0.621 610
9 0.146 -0.291 -0.124 0.107 0.353 0.672 0.632 253
10 0.129 -0.286 -0.107 0.112 0.340 0.617 0.653 49
Low score 0.158 -0.430 -0.170 0.098 0.407 0.766 0.591 1 527
High score 0.124 -0.349 -0.143 0.087 0.337 0.621 0.608 3 026
High-All -0.009 0.024 0.012 -0.001 -0.017 -0.045 0.009 ──
t-statistics
3
-0.925 ── ── ── ── ── ── ──
p-value (α = 0.05) 0.355 ── ── ── ── ── ── ──
High-Low -0.034 0.081 0.027 -0.012 -0.070 -0.146 0.017 ──
t-statistics -2.177 ── ── ── ── ── ── ──
p-value (α = 0.05) 0.030 ── ── ── ── ── ── ──
This table reports the 12-month buy-and-hold returns of the pooled firm-year observations for fundamental value strategy, which 
combines high B/M  strategy with fundamental strength measured as FS_SCORE . FS_SCORE  is equal to the sum of ten 
individual binary variables, or
where each binary variable equals one (zero) if the signal about future performance is good (bad). Stocks with an aggregate 
FS_SCORE  between 6 and 10 (0 and 4) are classified as high (low) FS_SCORE  stocks. There is a total of 5,639 firm-year 















𝐹𝑆_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐹𝑆_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_∆𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_∆𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+𝑁𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_∆𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_∆𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_∆𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
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The results are not supportive for applying fundamental analysis to the complete 
MOM-12 portfolio either. Looking at table 10, although momentum stocks with high 
FS_SCORE outperform momentum stocks with low FS_SCORE, the mean market-ad-
justed return difference of 1.3% is not statistically significant at the 0.05 significance 
level. Further, the high FS_SCORE stocks outperform all momentum stocks only by 0.3% 
and the mean return difference is also clearly statistically insignificant. Interestingly, 
there seems to be a negative monotonic relationship between the one-year ahead returns 
and fundamental strength among high FS_SCORE stocks as the returns decrease mono-
tonically when moving from score 6 to 10. This indicates that the relationship between 
fundamental strength and future returns when applied to the complete momentum portfo-
lio is not economically sound. Thus, we also reject the latter two hypotheses that (H3) 
momentum stocks with high FS_SCORE outperform momentum stocks with low 
Panel B: Market-adjusted returns
2
All firms 0.050 -0.425 -0.224 -0.010 0.259 0.563 0.488 5 639
FS_SCORE
0 -0.141 -0.348 -0.348 -0.141 ── ── 0.500 2
1 0.147 -0.699 -0.218 -0.042 0.381 1.277 0.410 39
2 0.067 -0.531 -0.324 -0.034 0.383 0.702 0.473 188
3 0.069 -0.516 -0.279 -0.022 0.321 0.654 0.482 456
4 0.054 -0.446 -0.228 -0.003 0.283 0.583 0.498 842
5 0.041 -0.424 -0.245 -0.021 0.246 0.605 0.473 1 086
6 0.043 -0.420 -0.235 -0.029 0.246 0.538 0.461 1 162
7 0.049 -0.364 -0.192 0.015 0.240 0.504 0.514 952
8 0.044 -0.395 -0.198 0.006 0.242 0.494 0.503 610
9 0.065 -0.394 -0.194 0.021 0.264 0.564 0.534 253
10 0.030 -0.306 -0.162 -0.012 0.198 0.436 0.490 49
Low score 0.062 -0.483 -0.256 -0.015 0.305 0.638 0.488 1 527
High score 0.047 -0.400 -0.205 -0.006 0.243 0.516 0.493 3 026
High-All -0.003 0.025 0.020 0.004 -0.016 -0.048 0.005 ──
t-statistics -0.315 ── ── ── ── ── ── ──
p-value (α = 0.05) 0.752 ── ── ── ── ── ── ──
High-Low -0.015 0.083 0.052 0.009 -0.062 -0.122 0.005 ──
t-statistics -1.020 ── ── ── ── ── ── ──






 Raw return is calculated for each stock as the 12-month buy-and-hold return commencing at the beginning of July in each 
calendar year t .
2
 Market-adjusted return is calculated for each stock as the 12-month buy-and-hold return commencing at the beginning of July 
in each calendar year t  less the corresponding return of S&P 1500 index over the respective holding period.
3
 Parametric t -statistics for returns are from the two-sample test for means (assuming unequal variances) under the null 












FS_SCORE and (H4) momentum stocks with high FS_SCORE outperform all momentum 
stocks. When looking at the return distribution, the results are also very similar to value 
stocks. The fundamental momentum investment approach does seem to help to shift the 
return distribution to the right at the lower percentiles, but fails to do this above the me-
dian. However, the proportion of winners in the high FS_SCORE portfolio (48.6%) is 
slightly higher than in the low FS_SCORE portfolio (45.9%). 
The explanation for the weak performance the fundamental momentum strategy is un-
likely to be the 12-month holding period, we believe. For example, Chen at al. (2016) 
found that the high-low FSCORE strategy produced a mean monthly excess return of 
0.35% over the 12-month holding period when applied to US stocks with the highest past 
12-month cumulative returns24. Instead, we believe that a more likely explanation could 
be the time gap between financial year-end and performance measurement. As firms in 
the US have to file Form 10-K report between 60 and 90 days after the fiscal-year end 
(depending on the public float), it is possible that ignoring the returns between the finan-
cial year-end and actual financial statement release date causes problems. Additionally, 
as market participants continually discount new information to prices (e.g. based on quar-
terly 10-Q reports), it is possible that fundamental information based on previous year’s 
financial statements is outdated. Consequently, it may be that momentum strategy could 
be enhanced using the latest quarterly financials and earnings momentum. 
Generally speaking, it is evident that FS_SCORE does not help to discriminate winners 
from losers among high B/M or MOM-12 stocks as we reject all our hypotheses. We find 
no clear positive relation between FS_SCORE and one-year market-adjusted returns in 
either the complete value or momentum portfolio, and the return spreads are either nega-
tive and/or statistically insignificant. Further, the FS_SCORE strategy does not shift the 
entire return distribution of value and momentum stocks to the right as it does not capture 
the exceptional 75th and 90th percentile returns for low FS_SCORE stocks. Hence, 
FS_SCORE seems to differentiate only between winners and losers in the lowest return 
percentiles. We believe that this could demonstrate that FS_SCORE does not capture ei-
ther mean-reverting fundamentals or other meaningful intangible information among 
stocks with weak ex ante fundamentals.  Based on these results, it also seems difficult to 
conclude that the market does not discount all ex ante fundamental information or that 
the market systematically underreacts to good financial information among stocks that 
are fundamentally strong ex ante as argued by Piotroski (2000), Duong et al. (2014) and 
Chen et al. (2016). Otherwise we would presumably expect to see a positive and more 
linear relationship between FS_SCORE and one-year ahead returns. 
                                                 
24 We wish to highlight, however, that our results are not fully comparable to Chen et al. (2016) as their 
sample included all non-financial firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ between 1973 to 2013, 
and stocks were sorted at the end of each month based on the past 12-month momentum and FSCORE. 
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Table 10 One-year buy-and-hold returns to fundamental momentum strategy 
 
Panel A: Raw returns
1
All firms 0.116 -0.375 -0.165 0.073 0.324 0.614 0.592 5 627
FS_SCORE
0 0.301 0.278 0.278 0.301 ── ── 1.000 2
1 0.073 -0.773 -0.355 0.143 0.424 0.936 0.560 25
2 0.134 -0.480 -0.166 0.048 0.425 0.653 0.554 112
3 0.102 -0.471 -0.240 0.015 0.360 0.742 0.522 272
4 0.123 -0.416 -0.200 0.068 0.338 0.732 0.562 617
5 0.107 -0.437 -0.204 0.057 0.327 0.669 0.585 903
6 0.133 -0.365 -0.162 0.079 0.343 0.634 0.590 1 145
7 0.126 -0.314 -0.130 0.090 0.315 0.583 0.620 1 131
8 0.105 -0.351 -0.142 0.075 0.300 0.569 0.603 917
9 0.094 -0.384 -0.167 0.081 0.311 0.516 0.618 424
10 0.077 -0.289 -0.091 0.064 0.258 0.414 0.570 79
Low score 0.118 -0.448 -0.208 0.053 0.349 0.735 0.552 1 028
High score 0.118 -0.349 -0.145 0.081 0.316 0.585 0.605 3 696
High-All 0.002 0.026 0.020 0.007 -0.008 -0.029 0.013 ──
t-statistics
3
0.210 ── ── ── ── ── ── ──
p-value (α = 0.05) 0.834 ── ── ── ── ── ── ──
High-Low 0.000 0.099 0.063 0.028 -0.033 -0.149 0.054 ──
t-statistics 0.028 ── ── ── ── ── ── ──
p-value (α = 0.05) 0.978 ── ── ── ── ── ── ──
This table reports the 12-month buy-and-hold returns of the pooled firm-year observations for fundamental momentum strategy, 
which combines high MOM-12  strategy with fundamental strength measured as FS_SCORE . FS_SCORE  is equal to the sum of 
ten individual binary variables, or
where each binary variable equals one (zero) if the signal about future performance is good (bad). Stocks with an aggregate 
FS_SCORE  between 6 and 10 (0 and 4) are classified as high (low) FS_SCORE  stocks. There is a total of 5,627 firm-year 















𝐹𝑆_𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐹𝑆_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_∆𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_∆𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡
+𝑁𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_∆𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_∆𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝑆_∆𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡
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4.2.3 Returns conditional on firm size 
Like Piotroski (2000), we also make a size partition analysis as the majority of stocks in 
our sample are smaller stocks listed in the S&P 400 and S&P 600 indices. Although fun-
damental value and momentum strategies did not yield abnormal returns when applied to 
the whole sample, it is possible that there are considerable differences in returns across 
size categories. In order to analyse return differences across size categories, all high B/M 
and MOM-12 stocks are divided annually into size terciles based on the market value at 
the end of June in year 𝑡. Using the 33.3 and 66.7 percentile size cut-offs yields a total of 
Panel B: Market-adjusted returns
2
All firms 0.033 -0.410 -0.221 -0.017 0.217 0.494 0.480 5 627
FS_SCORE
0 0.158 0.066 0.066 0.158 ── ── 1.000 2
1 -0.017 -0.693 -0.439 -0.020 0.230 1.001 0.440 25
2 0.015 -0.526 -0.326 0.008 0.258 0.540 0.509 112
3 0.017 -0.484 -0.282 -0.060 0.222 0.579 0.463 272
4 0.028 -0.452 -0.261 -0.043 0.225 0.556 0.447 617
5 0.033 -0.435 -0.238 -0.019 0.225 0.529 0.480 903
6 0.053 -0.401 -0.209 -0.011 0.245 0.543 0.490 1 145
7 0.038 -0.366 -0.198 -0.006 0.214 0.445 0.492 1 131
8 0.023 -0.383 -0.194 -0.015 0.190 0.450 0.479 917
9 0.015 -0.384 -0.203 -0.009 0.189 0.411 0.476 424
10 0.003 -0.317 -0.157 -0.028 0.167 0.328 0.481 79
Low score 0.023 -0.475 -0.276 -0.041 0.230 0.555 0.459 1 028
High score 0.036 -0.385 -0.202 -0.011 0.211 0.469 0.486 3 696
High-All 0.003 0.025 0.019 0.006 -0.006 -0.024 0.006 ──
t-statistics 0.303 ── ── ── ── ── ── ──
p-value (α = 0.05) 0.762 ── ── ── ── ── ── ──
High-Low 0.013 0.090 0.075 0.030 -0.019 -0.086 0.027 ──
t-statistics 0.767 ── ── ── ── ── ── ──






 Raw return is calculated for each stock as the 12-month buy-and-hold return commencing at the beginning of July in each 
calendar year t .
2
 Market-adjusted return is calculated for each stock as the 12-month buy-and-hold return commencing at the beginning of July 
in each calendar year t  less the corresponding return of S&P 1500 index over the respective holding period.
3
 Parametric t -statistics for returns are from the two-sample test for means (assuming unequal variances) under the null 












1,874–1,886 and 1,869–1,881 sample firms for small, medium and large size high B/M 
and MOM-12 portfolios. The results are presented in table 11 and 12. 
Table 11 shows that fundamental analysis is not more beneficial among small and me-
dium size value firms than among large value firms. In fact, it is more close to the oppo-
site. The difference in mean market-adjusted returns for the high-low and high-all port-
folios is negative for small and medium-sized firms and increases monotonically when 
moving from portfolio of small stocks to large stocks. Applying FS_SCORE for large 
stocks earns a mean market-adjusted return of 1.5% and 0.3% for the high-low and high-
all portfolios respectively. All return differences are, however, statistically insignificant. 
Consequently, there does not seem to be a statistically significant difference in returns 
across size categories. These results are surprising as various studies such as Fama and 
French (2012) have reported a small cap value premium and Piotroski (2000) found that 
the benefits of the FSCORE strategy concentrated among smaller stocks. Overall, we 
conclude that FS_SCORE strategy is not more beneficial among smaller value stocks. 
Table 11 One-year buy-and-hold returns to fundamental value strategy by size par-
tition 
 
All firms 0.051 -0.028 1 879 0.047 -0.014 1 886 0.052 0.014 1 874
FS_SCORE
0 ── ── 1 0.066 0.066 1 ── ── 0
1 0.095 -0.142 10 0.091 -0.042 13 0.225 0.113 16
2 0.166 0.088 81 0.030 -0.049 60 -0.056 -0.072 47
3 0.103 -0.052 155 0.026 -0.047 158 0.079 0.052 143
4 0.062 -0.015 309 0.074 0.029 284 0.023 -0.032 249
5 0.023 -0.059 354 0.041 -0.011 400 0.060 0.009 332
6 0.037 -0.046 393 0.088 -0.024 364 0.009 -0.025 405
7 0.052 -0.001 293 0.012 -0.003 339 0.086 0.046 320
8 0.037 -0.007 190 0.016 -0.029 191 0.072 0.049 229
9 0.030 -0.034 77 0.068 0.006 64 0.087 0.029 112
10 -0.021 -0.062 16 0.046 0.049 12 0.061 -0.012 21
Low score 0.088 -0.016 556 0.055 -0.017 516 0.039 -0.007 455
High score 0.040 -0.025 969 0.045 -0.015 970 0.054 0.023 1 087
High-All -0.011 0.003 ── -0.002 -0.001 ── 0.003 0.009 ──
t-statistics -0.613 ── ── -0.087 ── ── 0.189 ── ──
p-value (α = 0.05) 0.540 ── ── 0.930 ── ── 0.850 ── ──
High-Low -0.048 -0.009 ── -0.009 0.002 ── 0.015 0.030 ──
t-statistics -1.672 ── ── -0.355 ── ── 0.662 ── ──
p-value (α = 0.05) 0.095 ── ── 0.723 ── ── 0.508 ── ──
This table reports the 12-month market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns of the pooled firm-year observations for fundamental value strategy 
partioned by size. Each year high B/M  firms are divided into size terciles based on the market value of equity at the end of June. Thus, the 
33.3 and 66.7 percentile cutoffs are used to classify high B/M  firms into small, medium and large firms each year. There is a total of 1,879, 
1,886 and 1,874 firm-year observations in small, medium and large portfolios between 1997 and 2015. All other definitions and test 
statistics are as described in table 9. 
Small firms Medium firms Large firms
Mean Median n Mean Median n Mean Median n
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Table 12 shows slightly different results for high momentum stocks partitioned by size. 
Although small and medium size high FS_SCORE stocks earn higher returns than low 
FS_SCORE stocks and all momentum stocks, the return differences are clearly statisti-
cally insignificant for all portfolios. The high-low strategy works best among medium-
sized stocks, producing a mean market-adjusted return of 4.5% with t-statistics of 1.625. 
Among large stocks both high-low and high-all strategies produce negative returns (alt-
hough statistically non-meaningful). Consequently, these results confirm that fundamen-
tal analysis is not associated with higher returns among high momentum stocks in any 
particular size category, which is in line with the results from value portfolios. 
Table 12 One-year buy-and-hold returns to fundamental momentum strategy by 
size partition 
 
We believe there are various economically sound reasons which could explain our re-
sults that fundamental analysis is not more beneficial among smaller stocks. Firstly, in-
formation dissemination has presumably improved significantly over our sample period 
compared to early studies. As a significant portion of equity screening, analysis and trad-
ing is nowadays automated and information availability has increased dramatically over 
All firms 0.028 -0.043 1 877 0.033 -0.019 1881 0.037 0.001 1 869
FS_SCORE
0 0.066 0.066 1 0.250 0.250 1 ── ── 0
1 -0.035 -0.026 14 -0.115 0.009 4 0.074 -0.218 7
2 0.015 -0.033 55 0.018 0.060 33 0.014 -0.016 24
3 -0.009 -0.109 114 0.010 -0.077 88 0.069 0.050 70
4 0.048 -0.059 236 -0.014 -0.080 215 0.053 0.018 166
5 -0.016 -0.064 326 0.049 -0.019 300 0.074 0.029 277
6 0.061 -0.022 392 0.053 -0.011 378 0.045 -0.005 375
7 0.034 -0.026 355 0.048 0.001 394 0.030 -0.003 382
8 0.047 -0.009 245 0.009 -0.032 313 0.019 0.001 359
9 0.005 -0.009 122 0.065 0.023 125 -0.014 -0.036 177
10 -0.028 -0.064 17 -0.018 -0.041 30 0.041 0.065 32
Low score 0.026 -0.065 420 -0.005 -0.059 341 0.054 0.024 267
High score 0.042 -0.024 1 131 0.040 -0.010 1240 0.026 -0.007 1 325
High-All 0.014 0.019 ── 0.007 0.009 ── -0.011 -0.008 ──
t-statistics 0.803 ── ── 0.433 ── ── -0.838 ── ──
p-value (α = 0.05) 0.422 ── ── 0.665 ── ── 0.402 ── ──
High-Low 0.016 0.041 ── 0.045 0.049 ── -0.028 -0.030 ──
t-statistics 0.581 ── ── 1.625 ── ── -0.910 ── ──
p-value (α = 0.05) 0.561 ── ── 0.105 ── ── 0.364 ── ──
n Mean Median n
This table reports the 12-month market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns of the pooled firm-year observations for fundamental momentum 
strategy partioned by size. Each year high MOM-12  firms are divided into size terciles based on the market value of equity at the end of 
June. Thus, the 33.3 and 66.7 percentile cutoffs are used to classify high MOM-12  firms into small, medium and large firms each year. 
There is a total of 1,877, 1,881 and 1,869 firm-year observations in small, medium and large portfolios between 1997 and 2015. All other 
definitions and test statistics are as described in table 10.
Small firms Medium firms Large firms
Mean Median n Mean Median
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the past 20 years, simple fundamental strategies based on ex ante measures utilized five 
to seven months after the financial year-end could have lost their discriminative power. 
Secondly, unlike in the Piotroski’s (2000) study, our sample excludes all stocks below 
the 5th percentile in market value at the end of June each year. This could potentially 
have an adverse impact on fundamental value and momentum returns, but on the other 
hand we believe that the returns for the smallest stocks would be difficult to achieve due 
to various constraints such as illiquidity and arbitrage risk. 
4.3 Robustness checks 
4.3.1 Risk-adjusted returns for portfolios 
Table 13 reports returns on the FS_SCORE strategies across value and momentum port-
folios together with the corresponding results from the one-sample t-tests and the time-
series tests. In the time-series regressions we have regressed the monthly excess returns 
of fundamental value and momentum portfolios from 1997 to 2015 on the CAPM, the 
Fama-French three-factor model and the Carhart four-factor model risk-factors down-
loaded from the Kenneth R. French website. Hence, if these risk-adjusted return models 
explain the portfolios’ excess returns, the monthly regression intercepts should be close 
to zero and statistically insignificant using parametric t-tests. 
In the value portfolios it can be observed that the returns for hedge portfolios are 
clearly negative and statistically significant using the 0.05 significance level when returns 
are market-adjusted. The annualized market-adjusted returns for high-low and high-all 
portfolios are -10.2% and -8.9% with t-statistics of -2.193 and -2.268 respectively. The 
annualized market-adjusted return of 4.3% for long-only high FS_SCORE strategy is also 
statistically insignificant, whereas the corresponding return of 6.3% for long-only low 
FS_SCORE strategy is statistically significant with t-statistics of 2.040. Thus, these re-
sults confirm that low FS_SCORE stocks outperform high FS_SCORE stocks in the value 
context by a wide margin that is economically and statistically meaningful. This is also 
more in line with risk-based explanations for value premium as value stocks with low 
FS_SCORE are likely to be distressed and thus fundamentally riskier.  
When looking at the regression intercepts, it seems that the CAPM, the FF3 and the 
Carhart regressions explain relatively well the portfolio returns for fundamental value 
strategies. The regression intercepts are small and clearly statistically insignificant for 
high FS_SCORE, low FS_SCORE, high-low and all value stocks portfolios, leading us to 
reject statistically significant excess returns. However, the monthly intercept is around -
0.2% for high-all portfolio using all return models and clearly more than two standard 
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errors from zero (t-statistics = -3.588, -3.410 and -3.646), which rejects the CAPM, the 
FF3 and the Carhart model easily. Generally, the evidence from the parametric tests and 
the time-series regressions verifies our earlier results that led us to reject hypotheses H1 
and H2. Thus, we find no support for applying fundamental analysis in the value context, 
which is incongruent with the results of Piotroski (2000), Piotroski and So (2012) and 
Duong et al. (2014). 
For momentum portfolios the parametric tests reject the significance of market-ad-
justed returns across the board. Although high FS_SCORE portfolio produces an annual-
ized market-adjusted return of 3.9% (t-statistics = 1.928) compared to 1.8% (t-statistics = 
0.597) and 3.3% (t-statistics = 1.567) for low FS_SCORE portfolio and all momentum 
stocks portfolio respectively, all returns are less than two standard errors from zero. Fur-
ther, the annualized market-adjusted returns for high-low and high-all portfolios are neg-
ative and economically meaningful at -6.1% (t-statistics = -1.291) and -7.6% (t-statistics 
= -1.936), although statistically insignificant. Therefore, the parametric tests support the 
evidence that financially stronger momentum stocks do not outperform financially 
weaker momentum stocks and the complete portfolio of all momentum stocks when the 
returns are market-adjusted. 
The time-series regressions for momentum portfolios also support the conclusion that 
separating winners from losers using FS_SCORE does not produce abnormal returns. The 
monthly intercept for long-only high FS_SCORE portfolio is 0.3% and barely statistically 
meaningful with t-statistics of 1.989 using the CAPM regression. When size and value 
risk-factors are included in the regression, the monthly intercept drops to 0.2% and be-
comes statistically insignificant (t-statistics = 1.926). Further, when momentum is in-
cluded in the regression as the fourth risk-factor, the monthly intercept drops to 0.1% and 
becomes clearly statistically insignificant with t-statistics of 1.238. The monthly intercept 
for high-low hedge portfolio is also economically non-meaningful at around 0.1% and 
clearly less than two standard errors from zero using all return models (t-statistics = 0.350, 
0.410 and 0.361). Lastly, similar to the high-all value portfolio, the monthly intercept for 
high-all momentum portfolio is negative at around -0.1% and at least two standard errors 
from zero using all return models. Consequently, as with value portfolios, the parametric 
tests and regression analysis is fully in line with the earlier findings from the pooled port-
folio tests in the previous section that rejected hypotheses H3 and H4. 
In summary, our robustness tests strengthen the conclusion that high FS_SCORE strat-
egy has not been useful in separating winners from losers in either value or momentum 
context from 1997 to 2015. We believe that this is most likely due to the significant time 
gap between financial year-ends and portfolio formation dates and/or due to the fact that 
fundamental strategies are no longer as useful as they used to be. In addition, it could be 
that our assumption for delisting returns of zero causes a positive return bias among low 
FS_SCORE stocks that are more likely to delist for performance related reasons. If a stock 
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delists due to performance related reasons, it is highly likely that the return could be neg-
ative for shareholders. Therefore, it is possible that our results overstate the performance 
of low FS_SCORE stocks. 
Table 13 Portfolio returns to FS_SCORE strategies across value and momentum 
context 
 
4.3.2 Performance over time 
Tables 14 and 15 present the annual one-year market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns for 
fundamental value and momentum strategies over the sample period from 1997 to 2015. 
Additionally, figures 4 and 5 show the performance of fundamental value and momentum 
strategies as well as the market (S&P 1500 index) over the sample period.  
Starting with value stocks, the portfolio of low FS_SCORE stocks has outperformed 
the portfolio of high FS_SCORE stocks on average by 1.7% over the sample period. Alt-
hough the high FS_SCORE strategy has outperformed the market on average by 4.2%, 
the market-adjusted return has been positive only 10 out of 18 years. Further, the high-
Raw 0.125 0.145 0.132 -0.020 -0.007 0.121 0.100 0.115 0.021 0.006
t-statistics 2.666 2.679 2.730 -1.057 -1.031 2.828 1.905 2.566 0.931 1.050
p-value 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.292 0.304 0.005 0.058 0.011 0.353 0.295
Market-adjusted 0.043 0.063 0.050 -0.102 -0.089 0.039 0.018 0.033 -0.061 -0.076
t-statistics 1.666 2.040 1.930 -2.193 -2.268 1.928 0.597 1.567 -1.291 -1.936
p-value 0.097 0.043 0.055 0.029 0.024 0.055 0.551 0.119 0.198 0.054
Sharpe ratio 0.518 0.536 0.537 -0.518 -0.978 0.546 0.351 0.490 -0.013 -0.644
CAPM alpha 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001
t-statistics 1.190 1.496 1.342 -1.815 -3.588 1.989 0.204 1.432 0.350 -2.000
FF3 alpha 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001
t-statistics 0.482 0.711 0.688 -1.677 -3.410 1.926 -0.246 1.217 0.410 -2.093
Carhart alpha 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001
t-statistics 1.000 -1.743 1.351 -1.743 -3.646 1.238 -0.466 0.639 0.361 -2.057
This table reports the annualised raw returns, market-adjusted returns and Sharpe ratios for high FS_SCORE , low F_SCORE  and hedge portfolios 
across value and momentum samples. We also report the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Fama-French Three-Factor model (FF3) and 
the Carthart Four-Factor model (Carhart) alphas for the excess returns of different investment strategies. Each year at the beginning of July in year t 
we form equally-weighted portfolios and we hold these portfolios for the following 12-months (annual rebalancing). Hence, the initial equal-weight 
for each stock changes in the portfolios during the 12-month buy-and-hold period as we do not rebalance monthly to maintain equal weights. The t -
statistics for raw returns and market-adjusted returns are from the two-sided t -test under the null hypothesis that the portfolio returns are zero. 
When calculating the CAPM, the FF3 and the Carthart adjusted alphas, the t -statistics have been calculated using the Newey-West standard errors 
to take into account potential autocorrelation issues. All other definitions are as previously described.
High-Low High-All








low return difference has been positive only 7 out of 18 years, meaning that low 
FS_SCORE stocks have outperformed continually. This was particularly the case between 
2003 and 2010, when low FS_SCORE stocks outperformed the high FS_SCORE stocks 
for eight consecutive years. Surprisingly, the low FS_SCORE portfolio outperformed dur-
ing the financial crisis between 2007 and 2009. The highest annual market-adjusted return 
for high FS_SCORE portfolio has been 50.7% in 2000, compared to 45.6% for low 
FS_SCORE portfolio in the same year. On the other hand, the lowest return for both high 
FS_SCORE and low FS_SCORE portfolio was in 1998 when portfolios returned -23.8% 
and -17.7% respectively. It can also be seen that the annual return sign has been similar 
for both portfolios (the only exception being year 2006).  
Table 14 One-year market-adjusted returns to fundamental value portfolios by in-
vestment year 
 
Figure 4 shows the performance of fundamental value strategies as well as the market. 
It can be seen that both high and low FS_SCORE portfolios performed relatively similarly 
1997 -0.063 -0.150 -0.093 0.088 0.030
1998 -0.238 -0.177 -0.206 -0.060 -0.031
1999 -0.098 -0.098 -0.111 0.000 0.013
2000 0.507 0.456 0.492 0.052 0.015
2001 0.330 0.162 0.282 0.168 0.048
2002 -0.069 -0.082 -0.088 0.013 0.019
2003 0.168 0.215 0.206 -0.047 -0.037
2004 0.095 0.137 0.100 -0.042 -0.005
2005 0.083 0.139 0.084 -0.055 0.000
2006 -0.009 0.058 0.016 -0.068 -0.025
2007 -0.044 -0.035 -0.043 -0.009 -0.001
2008 0.022 0.069 0.053 -0.047 -0.031
2009 0.056 0.232 0.136 -0.176 -0.080
2010 0.037 0.124 0.086 -0.087 -0.049
2011 -0.116 -0.135 -0.112 0.019 -0.004
2012 0.123 0.120 0.093 0.003 0.029
2013 0.054 0.117 0.076 -0.064 -0.022
2014 -0.087 -0.089 -0.093 0.002 0.006
Mean 0.042 0.059 0.049 -0.017 -0.007
# Positive 10 11 11 7 7







This table shows the one-year market-adjusted returns by investment year to high FS_SCORE , low FS_SCORE , all high B/M 
and hedge portfolios. All other definitions are as previously described.







until the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Both strategies have overperformed the market dur-
ing the sample period, but since the financial crisis low FS_SCORE portfolio has outper-
formed high FS_SCORE portfolio by a wide margin. This strengthens our view that 




Figure 4 Performance of fundamental value strategies 
Continuing with momentum stocks, the high FS_SCORE strategy has been much more 
successful among momentum stocks than among value stocks. The high FS_SCORE port-
folio outperformed the low FS_SCORE portfolio on average by 2.0% and in 11 out of 18 
years. The highest and the lowest market-adjusted returns for high FS_SCORE portfolio 
were 26.3% and -12.4% in 2001 and 1998, whereas the corresponding returns for low 
FS_SCORE portfolio were 38.3% and -28.9% in 1999 and 1997 respectively. Interest-
ingly, there seems to be more variation in returns between the high and low FS_SCORE 
portfolios among momentum stocks than value stocks. For momentum stocks, the return 
sign was the opposite 5 out of 18 years for high and low FS_SCORE portfolios. However, 
as there is a small number of annual observations in the low FS_SCORE portfolios rela-
tive to the high FS_SCORE portfolios particularly among momentum stocks, it could be 












All high B/M High FS_SCORE Low FS_SCORE Market (S&P 1500)
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Table 15 One-year market-adjusted returns to fundamental momentum portfolios 
by investment year 
 
Figure 5 shows the performance of fundamental momentum strategies and the market. 
Interestingly, it can be seen that high FS_SCORE portfolio has outperformed low 
FS_SCORE portfolio almost during the entire sample period. This is particularly true after 
the financial crisis, as momentum portfolio with high FS_SCORE stocks has risen by 
108% compared to 63% for momentum portfolio with low FS_SCORE stocks. This veri-
fies our earlier results that fundamentals work better in momentum than value context. 
Although this is somewhat surprising, it could be that FS_SCORE captures some of the 
factors that drive momentum anomaly. It is possible that investors underreact to frequent 
and gradual information among momentum stocks such as improving sales and earnings, 
which would support results by Da et al. (2014). 
 
1997 -0.044 -0.289 -0.111 0.245 0.067
1998 -0.124 -0.053 -0.109 -0.070 -0.015
1999 0.172 0.383 0.248 -0.211 -0.077
2000 0.054 -0.007 0.013 0.061 0.041
2001 0.263 0.177 0.235 0.086 0.028
2002 -0.018 -0.080 -0.031 0.062 0.013
2003 0.144 0.127 0.142 0.017 0.002
2004 0.039 -0.027 0.019 0.066 0.020
2005 0.092 0.001 0.069 0.091 0.023
2006 -0.038 0.045 -0.027 -0.083 -0.011
2007 0.016 0.037 0.016 -0.021 0.000
2008 0.015 -0.171 -0.026 0.186 0.040
2009 0.035 0.098 0.045 -0.063 -0.010
2010 0.129 0.123 0.142 0.006 -0.012
2011 -0.101 -0.127 -0.101 0.026 0.000
2012 0.013 0.074 0.028 -0.061 -0.015
2013 0.027 0.062 0.038 -0.035 -0.011
2014 0.012 -0.050 -0.014 0.062 0.026
Mean 0.038 0.018 0.032 0.020 0.006
# Positive 13 10 11 11 10







This table shows the one-year market-adjusted returns by investment year to high FS_SCORE , low FS_SCORE , all high 
MOM-12  and hedge portfolios. All other definitions are as previously described.
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
The key purpose of this thesis was to examine whether a simple accounting-based funda-
mental analysis could be used to enhance value and momentum strategies. Both value and 
momentum effects have been studied extensively from asset pricing point of view, 
whereas the evidence on combining style and fundamentals is still fairly limited. Previous 
studies have shown, however, that both value and momentum returns can be improved by 
controlling for fundamental strength and/or quality. Piotroski (2000), Piotroski and So 
(2012) and Chen et al. (2016) found that fundamentally stronger value and momentum 
stocks outperformed weaker ones, whereas Novy-Marx (2013) showed that there is a 
gross profit premium among value stocks. These results imply some kind of premium 
towards fundamentally stronger value and momentum stocks, which provided an inter-
esting framework to study fundamental value and momentum strategies. In order to sep-
arate winners from losers using fundamental analysis, we applied the FS_SCORE devel-
oped by Gray and Carlisle (2013). The FS_SCORE is based on the original FSCORE by 
Piotroski (2000), but Gray and Carlisle (2013) have made some relatively minor but well-
argued improvements. 
Our main findings were somewhat unexpected based on the previous research. Alt-
hough less than 50% of all value and momentum stocks produced positive one-year ahead 
market-adjusted returns, we found no support for fundamental analysis in either value or 
momentum portfolios between 1997 and 2015. Within the portfolio of high B/M stocks, 
the high FS_SCORE stocks produced a mean one-year market-adjusted return of 4.7%, 
compared to mean return of 6.2% for the low FS_SCORE stocks. The surprising return 
spread was, however, statistically insignificant using parametric t-test. In the case of high 
MOM-12 stocks, the strategy that bought expected winners and shorted expected losers 
generated a one-year market-adjusted return of 1.3%, but the return difference was also 
clearly statistically insignificant. Further, the size partition analysis showed that funda-
mental analysis was not economically or statistically more beneficial among small-sized 
stocks. Consequently, the return earned by the investors selecting the complete portfolio 
of high B/M or high MOM-12 stocks could not be increased in a meaningful way by se-
lecting fundamentally stronger stocks. 
The main findings were also strengthened using portfolio approach and the CAPM, 
the Fama-French three-factor model and the Carhart four-factor model time-series regres-
sions. Time-series tests showed that the monthly regression intercepts were primarily 
close to zero and less than two standard errors from zero. Thus, fundamental value and 
momentum strategies did not produce abnormal risk-adjusted returns after controlling for 
well-known systematic risk factors. The results were also relatively robust across the sam-
ple period as the high FS_SCORE portfolio outperformed the low FS_SCORE portfolio 
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only 7 out of 18 years in the value context, compared to 11 out of 18 years among mo-
mentum stocks.  
Overall, it is evident that the FS_SCORE strategy does not help to discriminate winners 
from losers among value or momentum stocks as we rejected all our hypotheses. These 
results are incongruent with the earlier results by Piotroski (2000), Piotroski and So 
(2012) and Chen et al. (2016) as well as by Mohanram (2005) to some extent. We believe 
this demonstrates that ex ante fundamental measures such as FS_SCORE do not always 
capture mean-reverting fundamentals and other meaningful information among stocks 
that are fundamentally weak ex ante. We also believe that the significant time gap be-
tween financial year-ends and portfolio formation dates is likely to be problematic as the 
information dissemination has presumably greatly improved over the past 20 years. It 
could thus be more meaningful to study fundamental value and momentum strategies us-
ing quarterly financial information. Further, it is also possible that fundamental strategies 
have partly lost their ability to generate abnormal returns over long-term holding periods. 
This argument is in line with the recent evidence from US by Hanson and Dhanuka 
(2015), who found that various fundamental strategies including FSCORE did not pro-
duce statistically significant abnormal returns between 2000 and 2013. However, it is 
good to remember that our results could overstate the performance of low FS_SCORE 
stocks due to the assumption of zero delisting returns or due to other biases relating to the 
treatment of delistings in the Thomson Reuters Datastream database. 
Based on our results it is difficult to argue that the financial markets are inefficient or 
that the information dissemination is weak among value and momentum stocks. Other-
wise the financial markets would not discount all publicly available historical information 
into prices, which could potentially produce abnormal returns among value and momen-
tum stocks that are fundamentally strong ex ante. Continuing with the same logic, if the 
market participants systematically underreacted to good financial information over long 
time periods among stocks that are fundamentally strong ex ante, we would presumably 
expect to see a strong positive and linear relationship between FS_SCORE and one-year 
ahead returns. This also motivates us to focus on short-term fundamental strategies be-
sides long-term strategies and we believe that new research on this topic could produce 
important information both for practitioners and academics in the world of finance. 
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APPENDIX 1 FS_SCORE VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
 











 All financial signals are calculated as in Piotroski's (2000) study except FS_FCFTA t , NEQISS t  and FS_ΔFCFTA t .
2
 All financial variables are calculated from annual financial statements.
3
 These Datastream fields are used to calculate the financial signals.
Return on assets
ROA t = Net income before extra items/preferred dividends t 
/ Total assets t-1
If FS_ROA t  > 0, then 1, 
otherwise 0
Free cash flow
FCFTA t = (Net income before extra items/preferred 
dividends t  + Depreciation, depletion and amortization t  - 
Change in working capital t  - Capital expenditures t ) / Total 
assets t-1
If FS_FCFTA t  > 0, then 1, 
otherwise 0
Accruals
ACCRUAL t  = (Net income before extra items/preferred 
dividends t   - Net cash flow from operating activities t ) / 
Total assets t-1
If FS_ACCRUAL t  < 0, 
then 1, otherwise 0
Change in leverage
4
ΔLEVER t = [Total debt t  / (½Total assets t  + ½Total assets t-
1 ) ] - [Total debt t-1  / (½Total assets t-1  + ½Total assets t-2 )]
If FS_ΔLEVER t  < 0, then 
1, otherwise 0
Change in liquidty
ΔLIQUID t  = (Total current assets t  / Total current 
liabilities t ) - (Total current assets t-1  / Total current 
liabilities t-1 )
If FS_ΔLIQUID t  > 0, then 
1, otherwise 0
Net equity issuance
NEQISS t = Common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted 
etc. t  - Net proceeds from sale/issue of common & preferred 
equity t




Change in gross margin ΔMARGIN t = MARGIN t  - MARGIN t-1
If FS_ΔMARGIN t  > 0, 
then 1, otherwise 0
Change in return on assets ΔROA t = ROA t  - ROA t-1
If FS_ΔROA t  > 0, then 1, 
otherwise 0
Change in free cash flow ΔFCFTA t = FCFTA t  - FCFTA t-1
If FS_ΔFCFTA t  > 0, then 
1, otherwise 0
WC01551, WC01151, 





WC04900, WC04601 and 
WC02999






FS_SCORE = FS_ROA + FS_FCFTA + FS_ACCRUAL + FS_ΔLEVER + FS_ΔLIQUID 
+ NEQISS + FS_ΔROA + FS_ΔFCFTA + FS_ΔMARGIN + FS_ΔTURN
Change in asset turnover
ΔTURN t = Total sales t  / (½Total assets t  + ½Total assets t-
1 ) - Total sales t-1  / (½Total assets t-1  + ½Total assets t-2 )
If FS_ΔTURN t  > 0, then 1, 
otherwise 0
4
 Includes all interest-bearing debt and capitalized lease obligations. Piotroski (2000) also uses total long-term debt (including long-term debt classified as current) to 
calculte change in leverage.
